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This thesis investigates several potential drivers of surveillance confrontations involving 
United States’ assets on the People’s Republic of China’s maritime periphery, by 
exploring encounters such as the April 2001 EP-3 and the March 2009 USNS Impeccable 
(T-AGOS-23) incidents. The evidence herein suggests that the 2001 and 2009 
confrontations were most likely driven by issue elevation, in which the PRC’s maritime 
forces were given the charge to opportunistically challenge U.S. maritime surveillance 
operations during periods of enhanced political efficiency. These encounters were likely 
part of broad efforts to elevate maritime sovereignty and surveillance issues during 
periods in which U.S. surveillance norms were perceived to be most vulnerable to 
political challenge. Potential secondary drivers of the PRC’s behavior are also woven 
through this assessment.  
From this conclusion, future vulnerability periods may reappear, in which there is 
an increased probability that a similar broad pattern of surveillance confrontations will 
resurface. This work concludes by assessing current PRC-U.S. maritime trends and 
providing recommendations in support of a comprehensive plan that spans the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. This adaptive effort may mitigate future surveillance 
confrontations, their escalation, and conflict, to protect U.S. military, diplomatic, and 
national interests.  
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 I. OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Surveillance confrontations on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) maritime 
periphery toward the United States (U.S.), such as the April 2001 EP-3 and March 2009 
USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) incidents, have been the subject of much debate. 
Literature related to these encounters can be grouped into the three broad categories of 
incident specific, domestic, and international analysis. Across these themes, observers 
highlight the “who, what, where, why, how,” and the consequences of these 
engagements, but largely neglect the “when.” 
U.S. surveillance operations on the PRC’s maritime periphery have been a 
standing dispute, particularly since the late 1990s, but the continuous challenge of these 
activities would likely have been detrimental to bilateral relations. In 2001, the April 1 
EP-3 collision occurred within one week of a March 23 incident involving USNS 
Bowditch (T-AGS-62). After nearly eight years, in which only one similar encounter 
transpired, harassment against USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) and USNS Impeccable 
reemerged one day apart, on March 4 and 5, 2009, respectively. The synchronization of 
these two groups of incidents and their alignment to specific geopolitical pressures 
warrant greater analysis. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer three major questions: First, what potential drivers of 
the PRC’s behavior are present surrounding its surveillance confrontations with U.S. 
assets? Second, of these drivers, which were most likely the primary instigators of the 
PRC’s behavior? Third, based upon the likely origins of this behavior, how can the U.S. 
mitigate this future dynamic? 
C. IMPORTANCE 
Over the past three decades, the PRC has attained exceptional economic growth, 
significant military modernization, and increased political influence around world. A 
1 
 rising PRC amidst established U.S. hegemony creates an inherent level of tension that 
must be comprehended, anticipated, and moderated. Understanding the PRC’s behavioral 
drivers underlying its surveillance confrontations enables better management of this 
complex relationship by the United States through the development of mitigation 
strategies. 
D. THESIS 
PRC-U.S. maritime developments, each incident’s specific narratives, and the 
surrounding geopolitical conditions are all assessed for potential drivers of the 
surveillance confrontations. The analysis presented in this thesis suggests that various 
contributing factors play a role: operational opportunism, domestic pressures, issue 
elevation, political reaction, and political linkage. These factors draw on a range of 
supporting and conflicting evidence as instigators of the PRC’s behavior. Each category 
is defined: 
• Operational opportunism–surveillance confrontation as a local 
commander’s opportunistic initiative. 
• Domestic pressures–surveillance confrontation as an initiative in support 
of domestic objectives. 
• Issue elevation–surveillance confrontation as a strategically timed 
initiative to politically elevate maritime surveillance and sovereignty 
issues. 
• Political reaction–surveillance confrontation as an adverse reaction to 
separate political pressures. 
• Political linkage–surveillance confrontation as an initiative to create 
political leverage toward separate issues. 
Several drivers likely shaped each incident; however, the most important drivers 
of these confrontations were issue elevation and operational opportunism in early 2001 
and 2009, while the 2002 incident was most likely limited to operational opportunism. 
Since the continuous challenge of U.S. surveillance operations would likely have been 
detrimental to bilateral relations, it is most likely that these activities are generally 
contested during specific periods when surveillance confrontations possess enhanced 
2 
 political efficiency. Aligned to this claim in early 2001 and 2009, issue elevation and 
operational opportunism likely converged under a strategy in which the PRC’s maritime 
forces were given the charge to opportunistically challenge U.S. maritime surveillance 
assets during each period. Issue elevation likely emerged because the PRC perceived U.S. 
surveillance norms to be under increased susceptibility to political challenge early into 
both presidencies; this perception of political vulnerability was likely the basis of the 
PRC’s initiation of opportunistic harassment strategies. Secondary motives from 
domestic pressures, political reactions, and political linkages were also present in both 
2001 and 2009; however, they cannot be linked to these confrontations with any degree 
of certainty. Based upon this dynamic, evaluating, preparing, and implementing a 
comprehensive plan prior to periods projected to be vulnerable to issue elevation may 
avert surveillance confrontations, their escalation, and conflict, protecting U.S. military, 
diplomatic, and national interests. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current literature assessing PRC-U.S. surveillance confrontations is first 
explored as the foundation of this study. In general, it addresses the following topics: 
1. Incident analysis literature, which compares divergent PRC-U.S. legal 
positions, tangible interests, and maritime solutions; 
2. Domestic analysis literature, which explores the PRC’s social and political 
domestic pressures in relation to surveillance confrontations; and 
3. International analysis literature, which investigates the regional and 
international causes and effects, and bilateral implications of surveillance 
confrontations. 
While most scholarly sources bridge these categories throughout their discussions, 
sorting concepts into these structures enables further development of specific themes to 
highlight their relationship to the PRC’s behavioral drivers. Figure 1 outlines the eight 
sub-themes relating to surveillance confrontations discussed in this chapter. 
3 
  
Figure 1.  PRC-U.S. Surveillance Confrontation Literature 
1. Incident Analysis 
Incident analysis literature addresses legalities, tangible interests, and maritime 
specific solutions related to surveillance confrontations. Legal analysis contrasts PRC and 
U.S. viewpoints on international law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) is recognized as the international legal basis for maritime operations.1 
Peter Dutton highlights contradictory PRC and U.S. positions regarding state authority 
over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), stating that these differences “flow from 
strategic mistrust and from divergent conceptions of law of the sea.”2 People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) Major General (ret.) Peng Guanqian highlights the PRC’s position, stating: 
the “legislative purpose of UNCLOS is that operations may be undertaken ‘only for 
peaceful purposes.’”3 PRC sources consider military surveillance beyond this intent. 
Jonathan Odom contrasts the U.S. viewpoint, stating that UNCLOS “does not give the 
1 Although the U.S. viewpoint is generally aligned to UNCLOS, it has not yet ratified the convention 
for reasons highlighted in Chapter II.  
2 Peter Dutton, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and 
International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2010), 11, 
http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-
Institute/Publications/documents/China-Maritime-Study-7_Military-Activities-in-the-.pdf. 
3 Peng Guanqian, Military Activities, 22. 
4 
                                                 
 coastal state the right to limit high seas freedoms of other states beyond the coastal state’s 
territorial seas.”4 Significant U.S. and PRC literature elaborates variations of conflicting 
legalities, which comprise one framework in which surveillance confrontations appear. 
Literature assessing tangible interests contrasts the specific concerns held by the 
PRC and U.S. in an EEZ. Michael Swaine assesses PRC tangible EEZ interests to be 
maintaining submarine secrecy and U.S. interests to be intelligence gathering.5 
Additional U.S. concerns in the EEZ include Raul Pedrozo’s discussion of the importance 
of geographic surveys and David Bennett’s necessity for the U.S. to uphold “freedom of 
the seas” when this norm is contested.6 Identifying each nation’s specific EEZ interests is 
necessary to frame potential drivers of surveillance confrontations. 
Another body focuses on maritime solution analysis; it provides maritime-specific 
resolutions to prevent future PRC-U.S. confrontations in the EEZ. Again, Peng indicates 
that solutions from the PRC’s perspective involve respect for EEZ sovereignty, requisite 
permission for foreign military activities in the EEZ, and self-restraining mechanisms.7 
From a U.S. standpoint, Pedrozo believes that the Military Maritime Consultative 
Agreement (MMCA) can serve as an effective maritime incident prevention tool.8 Rear 
Admiral (ret.) Eric McVadon further recommends an “Incidents at Sea Agreement” 
(INCSEA) between the U.S. and PRC.9 Literature providing potential maritime 
4 Jonathan G. Odom, “The True “Lies of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who 
Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned,” 
Michigan State Journal of International Law 18, no. 3 (2010): 31, http://jnslp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/the-true-lies-of-the-impeccable-incident-odom-msujil-may-2010.pdf. Jonathan 
Odom is part of the U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps. 
5 Michael D. Swaine, “The U.S.-China Spat at Sea,” Foreign Policy (March 11, 2009), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/03/11/U.S.-china-spat-at-sea/3546. 
6 Raul Pedrozo, “Military Activities,” 29; David Bennett, “An Analysis of the China’s Offshore Active 
Defense and the People’s Liberation Army Navy,” Global Security Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 134, 
http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bennett%20China.pdf. 
7 Peng, “China’s Maritime Rights,” 20–21. 
8 Raul Pedrozo, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College 
Review 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 109, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/d11a2362-fa30–4742–8ec4-
c8bed2025114/Close-Encounters-at-Sea--The-USNS-Impeccable-Incid.aspx. 
9 Eric A. McVadon, “The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea,” China 




                                                 
 resolutions is applicable for developing broader mitigation strategies for future incidents. 
Incident specific literature highlighting legal positions, tangible interests, and maritime 
solutions is useful for exploring potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior and responding 
to this future dynamic. 
2. Domestic Analysis 
Domestic analysis explores the PRC’s social and political pressures and their 
influences upon surveillance confrontations. Social analysis relates these engagements to 
the PRC’s broader social setting. Swaine presents several explanations for increased 
incidents from this perspective: “Such behavior is attributed to a variety of factors 
generally associated with growing Chinese confidence, pride, and (paradoxically) 
insecurity.”10 Robert Ross analyzes Chinese naval nationalism and concludes that 
“nationalism, rather than security, is driving China’s naval ambition.”11 Alastair Johnson 
investigates the PRC’s media-blog dynamics, stating its importance in “explaining the 
speed and intensity of future security dilemma dynamics between…the United States and 
China.”12 Analyzing the PRC’s social atmosphere exposes its potential influence on 
surveillance confrontations. 
Political analysis surveys the PRC’s bureaucratic landscape in relation to 
surveillance confrontations. In 1992, John Garver concluded regarding an early period, 
“China’s campaigns in the South China Sea…were driven largely by parochial 
bureaucratic interests, yet inspired by a vision of China’s global position centuries 
hence.”13 Garver’s early 1990s analysis remains relevant to current PRC political 
conditions, such as Swaine and Fravel’s assertion that subnational and non-governmental 
10 Michael D Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 32 (May 
2010):  2, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM32MS.pdf. 
11 Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” 
International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 46, 
http://cc.sjtu.edu.cn/G2S/eWebEditor/uploadfile/20120914184814311.pdf. 
12 Alastair I. Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” International 
Security 37, no. 4 (2013):  48, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3704_pp007–048.pdf. 
13 John W. Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and 
National Interests,” The China Quarterly, no. 132 (December, 1992): 1028, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000045513. 
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 actors, including “oil companies, fishermen, scientists, five marine law enforcement 
agencies, and local governments,”14 play a role in domestic maritime pressures, as well 
as Mark Redden and Philip Saunders’ description of the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy’s (PLAN) political benefits derived from its defense of maritime sovereignty, to 
include: “clout in inter-service debates…public support, and…increased resources for 
naval modernization.”15 Analysis of the PRC’s political climate is vital to understanding 
possible bureaucratic drivers of the confrontations. Accounting for the social and political 
origins of surveillance confrontations enables isolation of potential domestic sources of 
the PRC’s behavior. 
3. International Analysis 
International analysis investigates the international causes, effects, and PRC-U.S. 
bilateral implications of surveillance confrontations. International causal analysis 
identifies potential external instigators of the PRC’s behavior. Peng outlines one driving 
factor for the PRC, stating that the scope of its naval operations will not exceed “China’s 
self-defense needs,”16 and its actions are based in the “lessons of history, including being 
invaded and divided; [therefore], China is especially sensitive and firm on the issues of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.”17 U.S. sources present a variety of potential 
international instigators, including: Carlyle Thayer’s ideas of the PRC’s “disapproval of 
deeper U.S.-Vietnam security ties...[and]…geo-strategic concerns;”18 Saunders’ concepts 
of “eroding U.S. influence in Asia…[and the PRC’s desire to]…shape rules and 
norms;”19 and Derek Pham’s conclusion this behavior is “a natural consequence of an 
14 Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” 
China Leadership Monitor 35 (2011): 15, http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-
monitor/8146. 
15 Mark E. Redden and Philip C. Saunders, “Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval Interactions: Cold 
War Lessons and New Avenues of Approach,” China Strategic Perspectives 5, (Sep 2012): 19, 
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/china-perspectives/ChinaPerspectives-5.pdf. 
16 Peng, “China’s Maritime Rights,” 19. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Security 
Challenges 6, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 82–83, 
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol6no2Thayer.html.  
19 Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 21–22. 
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 unfortunate intersection between growing Chinese naval capacity and other states’ 
misunderstanding of China’s strategic outlook.”20 Additional sources focus on the PRC’s 
outward pressure upon the international system. From the standpoint of international 
relations theory and a rising PRC, Taylor Fravel presents the idea that rapidly growing 
“states find that they lack resources within their boundaries and thus face mounting 
‘lateral pressure’ to expand abroad…China moved to assert its claims…when it 
challenged the USNS Impeccable.”21 Building upon territorial expansion, Robert 
Haddick proposes that the incidents stem from an underlying “strategy of incremental 
actions…which add up over time to a major strategic change.”22 James Kraska portrays 
maritime confrontations as “part of an anti-access or sea-denial strategy…to reshape the 
exclusive economic zone from an area of limited jurisdiction focused on resource 
management and exploitation toward an area of quasi-sovereign ocean and airspace.”23 
Exposing international pressures enables their isolation as drivers of surveillance 
confrontations. 
The second international analysis subset assesses the effects that surveillance 
confrontations have upon regional and international dynamics. As pointed out by Alice 
Ba, EEZ surveillance and Southeast Asian territorial concerns share threads of 
substantive continuity, which enables an “opening for the United States to multilateralize 
and thus legitimate its specific strategic concerns through existing regional 
mechanisms,”24 and that these “developments potentially have damaged what may be 
20 Derek Pham, “Gone Rogue?: China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Journal of Politics 
and Society 22, no. 1 (2011): 140, http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:11370.  
21 M. Taylor Fravel, “International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: Assessing China’s Potential 
For Territorial Expansion,” International Studies Review 12 (2010): 513–514, 
http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2010.ISR.china.expansion.pdf.  
22 Robert Haddick, “Salami Slicing in the South China Sea,” SmallWarsJournal.com, August 3, 2102, 
quoted in Ronald O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes 
Involving China: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: Library of 
Congress, 2013), 16, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf. 
23 James Kraska, “Sovereignty at Sea,” Survival 51, no. 3 (June-July 2009): 15–16. 
24 Alice D. Ba, “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled are the 
Waters?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 33, no. 3 




                                                 
 [the Association of Southeast Asian Nation] ASEAN’s greatest resource–namely, its 
neutrality.”25 Saunders presents an alarming potential that these incidents contain a “risk 
of unsettling the regional security environment,”26 and he also outlines a less tangible, 
but important negative impact these encounters have on “China’s efforts to project a 
positive international image as a responsible power that is making positive contributions 
to regional and global security.”27 Understanding the regional and international effects of 
surveillance confrontations enables their comparison to benefits they provide to the PRC. 
The PRC-U.S. bilateral implications of surveillance confrontations comprise a 
third subset of the internationally focused discussions. Scholars on both sides concur with 
Peng’s assessment that “Sino-U.S. maritime relations are far behind other, more 
developed aspects of the bilateral relationship.”28 PLA General Xu Caihou cites 
surveillance as an impediment to stronger ties, on par with Taiwan arms sales and the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDA) of 2000.29 Together, these three factors are 
generally referred to as the “three obstacles” to stronger PRC-U.S. cooperation. Saunders 
assesses that “both the United States and China have more to lose if a military incident 
turns into a major bilateral political issue that impedes U.S.-China economic and 
international cooperation.”30 Regardless of the viewpoint, U.S. surveillance within the 
EEZ and the resulting PRC harassment strains relations. Understanding PRC-U.S. 
bilateral implications is necessary for linking drivers of the confrontations with their 
consequences upon the overarching relationship. Assessing the international causes and 
effects, and bilateral implications of surveillance confrontations enables their connection 
to the surrounding geopolitical landscape. 
Incident specific, domestic, and international scholarship all magnifies 
surveillance confrontations from varied perspectives. Most literature crosses over the 
25 Ibid., 283. 
26 Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 22–23. 
27 Ibid., 23. 
28 Peng, “China’s Maritime Rights,” 19. 
29 Thayer, “The United States,” 81–82. 
30 Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 17. 
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 aforementioned themes or relates to additional topics; however, these divisions enable an 
organized basis for understanding potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior. The focus of 
this study is the consideration of concurrent geopolitical drivers, which are largely absent 
from these themes; however, many of the ideas expressed in current literature will be 
applied throughout this investigation. 
F. OVERVIEW 
To identify, assess, and project the PRC’s drivers underlying its surveillance 
confrontations, the 2001 and 2009 incidents are analyzed through the lenses of PRC-U.S. 
maritime development, each incident’s specific narratives, and the surrounding 
geopolitical landscapes. Chapter II presents the development of PRC-U.S. maritime 
relations to 2001. Chapter III employs a case study to explore the USNS Bowditch and 
EP-3 incidents in early 2001. Chapter IV employs a second case study to examine 
significant events in PRC-U.S. relations surrounding the 2001 incidents. Chapter V 
presents the development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations from 2001 to 2009. Chapter VI 
employs a third case study to explore the USNS Victorious and USNS Impeccable 
incidents in early 2009. Chapter VII employs a fourth case study to examine significant 
events in PRC-U.S. relations surrounding the 2009 incidents. Once the confrontations are 
assessed through these lenses, potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior are examined 
across their divisions. Chapter VIII conducts a comparative analysis from this basis to 
identify the most likely instigators of surveillance confrontations. Once the most likely 
primary drivers are identified, they can be projected onto future PRC-U.S. relations. 
Chapter IX assesses the future of this dynamic by exploring the likely impact of current 
trends. Finally, Chapter X discusses military implications and mitigation strategies in 
light of these trends. Surveillance confrontations have evolved with the complexities of 
PRC-U.S. relations; however, the timings of these incidents in relation to several 
recurring drivers, remains Impeccable. 
10 
 II. PRC-U.S. MARITIME DEVELOPMENT (TO 2001) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To identify potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior during the 2001 surveillance 
confrontations, the development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations is first outlined. 
Maritime relations development is defined by the evolution of both nations’ norms in the 
offshore domain. This setting is explored to early 2001 as a foundation of the first set of 
incidents. 
B. PRC-U.S. MARITIME RELATIONS TO 2001 
The development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations to early 2001 was influenced by 
several interwoven factors, including: the evolution of historical circumstances, 
international norms, bilateral and multilateral initiatives, and recent dynamics. Each of 
these sub-sets is explored, revealing several volatile conditions underlying the 2001 
surveillance confrontations. 
1. Historical Circumstances 
Historical circumstances are defined by major events in the formative period of 
PRC-U.S. relations relating to maritime sovereignty issues, which impact modern 
surveillance confrontations. Pedrozo highlights an aspect of historical circumstances, 
stating: “for centuries, the navies of the world have operated and trained in waters 
seaward of other nation’s territorial seas without constraint or the consent of coastal 
states.”31 Within this context, however, China has experienced many historical 
infringements upon its sovereignty, particularly from maritime powers. Bennett outlines 
several examples, including: various 19th and 20th century offensives by Britain, France, 
Japan, and Russia, which divided Chinese territory; the imposed opening of trade by 
Great Britain during the Opium Wars; the French acquisition of Indochina; the Sino-
Japanese War of the 1894–95; and the progressive Japanese occupation of China in the 
31 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 103. 
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 1930s that lasted until the end of World War II.32 These historical struggles are often 
presented as China’s period of “national humiliation,”33 which is supported by Peng’s 
statement: “Given the lessons of history, including being invaded and divided, China is 
especially sensitive and firm on the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
Chinese government and the Chinese people will not compromise any vital interests 
related to national sovereignty and security.”34 Additionally, between 1945 and PRC-
U.S. rapprochement in the 1970s, Jonathan Wilkenfield lists several other adverse 
influences upon bilateral relations, including: the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil 
War in the late 1940s, the 1950–53 Korean War, and the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Straits 
crises.35 Together, these historical circumstances underpin modern tensions surrounding 
issues of maritime sovereignty, which were likely a strong element of the PRC’s adverse 
behavior towards foreign assets operating on its maritime periphery in 2001. 
2. International Norms 
International norms to early 2001 entailed divergent PRC and U.S. interpretations 
of international behavior, which also influenced the surveillance confrontations. Before 
World War II, liberal ideals attempted to foster peaceful international relations, an 
example of which was Wilson’s “Fourteen Points.” Point II promoted: “Absolute 
freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, 
except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the 
enforcement of international covenants.”36 From World War II through the 2001 
incidents, maritime sovereignty attained greater definition through international 
agreements. UNCLOS I was held in 1958 to define basic maritime domains; UNCLOS II 
was held in 1960, which failed to advance the issue; and UNCLOS III assembled on 
32 Bennett, “An Analysis of the China’s,” 128. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Peng, “China’s Maritime Rights.” 19. 
35 Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “Concepts and Methods in the Study of International Crisis Management,” in 
Managing Sino-American Crises, eds. Michael D. Swaine, Zhang Tuosheng, and Danielle F. S. Cohen, 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2006), 112. 
36 Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History, 8th ed. (New York: Appleton–Century–
Crofts, 1968), 138. 
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 November 16, 1973, was opened for signature on December 10, 1983, and was ratified by 
the PRC on June 7, 1996.37 Article 58 of UNCLOS defines rights of navigation within 
the EEZ: 
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, 
enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms 
referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of 
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and 
compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.38 
UNCLOS attempted to harmonize international interpretations of appropriate behavior in 
the EEZ; however, divergent interpretations of this convention have endured. 
The PRC and U.S. have fundamentally different interpretations of state rights in 
the EEZ. In conjunction with the PRC’s 1996 UNCLOS ratification, it declared: “In 
accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
the People’s Republic of China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an 
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.”39 On this basis, 
Yu Zhirong presents a PRC interpretation of EEZ rights: “international waters do not 
exist in UNCLOS and are not generally accepted. The American policy of conducting 
unauthorized military surveys in sea areas under the jurisdiction of another coastal state 
should be scrutinized for its illegality.”40 Conversely, Eugene Buck outlines how the U.S. 
did not originally ratify UNCLOS due to “provisions dealing with deep seabed mineral 
37 Background to UNCLOS, The Continental Self Program, accessed December 6, 2013, 
http://www.continentalshelf.org/about/1143.aspx. This is the website of The Continental Shelf Programme, 
which is coordinated by GRID-Arendal in Norway and was established to assist developing States and 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) to complete the activities required to delineate the outer limits of 
their continental shelf; Declarations and Statements, United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of 
the Sea, last modified October 29, 2013, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China%20Upon%20rati
fication. 
38 Part V: Exclusive Economic Zone, Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of The 
Sea, accessed December 6, 2013, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm. 
39 Declarations and Statements, United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs. 
40 Yu Zhirong, “Military Activities,” 41. 
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 resources beyond national jurisdiction.”41 Although this issue was amended in 1994, the 
U.S. has not yet ratified UNCLOS for several possible reasons, including Jeremy 
Rabkin’s assessment that it “has never agreed to treaties under which new standards can 
be imposed without express U.S. consent.”42 Regardless, Ronald O’Rourke points out 
that “the treaty’s provisions relating to navigational rights, including those in EEZs, 
reflect the U.S. position on the issue.”43 Additionally, the U.S. operates under Pedrozo’s 
interpretation that “nothing in UNCLOS or state practice changes the right of military 
forces of all nations to conduct military activities in the exclusive economic zone without 
coastal-state notice or consent.”44 At the U.S. Naval Institute conference WEST 2014, 
Rear Admiral James Foggo, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for 
Operations, Plans, and Strategy, contrasted enduring differences in PRC and U.S. 
interpretations of EEZ rights by recounting his dialogue with the PLAN Commander in 
Chief, Admiral Wu Shengli: 
[Admiral Wu] said: ‘you Americans want to talk about freedom of 
navigation, you don’t understand the meaning of the word. It’s not 
freedom of navigation, its freedom of passage. We have no issue with you 
passing through our EEZ from point A to point B, just don’t stop and 
loiter. That’s your definition of freedom of navigation–stopping and 
loitering.’ I said: ‘we operate with due regard and we’re not going to go 
anywhere–those are international waters.45 
This exchange highlights continued PRC-U.S. disagreements over EEZ operations. 
International norms reveal divergent PRC and U.S. interpretations of UNCLOS, so 
additional efforts have attempted to mitigate conflict. 
41 Eugene H. Buck, “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Living Resource Provisions,” 
Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress, January 18, 2011), 1. 
42 Ibid.; Jeremy Rabkin, “The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for America,” Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, no. 3 (2006): 1. http://cei.org/sites/default/files/Jeremy%20Rabkin%20-
%20The%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea%20Treaty%20A%20Bad%20Deal%20for%20America.pdf.  
43 O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive.” 34. 
44 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 103. 
45 James Foggo, “WEST 2014,” U.S. Naval Institute, February 13, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWhwm4SJxTw. 
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 3. Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives 
Bilateral and multilateral initiatives further influenced the 2001 surveillance 
confrontations; however, they were inadequate, lacking specificity, dispute settlement, 
and enforcement mechanisms. Redden and Sander highlight that the primary PRC-U.S. 
bilateral maritime coordination mechanism is the MMCA, “an initiative formalized ‘to 
reduce the chances of confrontation between the two militaries in the air and on the 
sea.’”46 The MMCA was signed on January 19, 1998, and consists of: “1. Annual 
meetings, normally scheduled for two to three days;…2. Working groups…to study and 
discuss agenda items;…[and]… 3. Special meetings, … for the purpose of consulting on 
specific matters of concern.”47 Redden and Saunders relay that MMCA working groups 
lack a defined structure, and “for the United States, the focus is primarily on the 
development of tactical-level deconfliction procedures; for China, MMCA is a venue to 
address broader political-military issues.”48 In particular, the issue of close in 
reconnaissance is central among these. MMCA was the primary PRC-U.S. mechanism 
for mitigating maritime confrontation; however, both sides approach it differently. 
Additional multilateral initiatives also influenced the 2001 confrontations. Redden 
and Saunders highlight several examples, including: International Regulation for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), which are the “international maritime rules of 
the road designed to eliminate collisions;”49 and for aircraft, International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) rules “are explicitly formulated for the civil aviation sector and also 
address interactions between civil and state aircraft, …[however,]… no provisions 
address state-state aircraft in international airspace.”50 A final multilateral mechanism to 
coordinate maritime interactions is the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES), 
46 Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 8. 
47 “Agreement Between The Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry 
of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to 
Strengthen Military Maritime Safety,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed November 25, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/us-china98.htm. 
48 Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 8. 
49 Ibid., 9. 
50 Ibid. 
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 first presented in 1998 to “enhance multinational cooperation at a professional level.”51 
Redden and Saunders state that CUES provides “‘safety measures and a means to limit 
mutual interference and uncertainty,’ is voluntary, …not binding, …[and]…arbitration is 
left to individual states.”52 The Diplomat reports that the PRC had opposed CUES until 
April 2014, previously “citing dissatisfaction with the word ‘code’ (implying legal force) 
in the title.”53 Thus, there existed several bilateral and multilateral initiatives that 
attempted to mitigate potential EEZ conflict prior to the 2001 confrontations, but these 
agreements were inadequate due to a lack of specificity, dispute settlement provisions, 
and enforcement mechanisms. 
4. Recent Dynamics 
The 2001 surveillance confrontations were also impacted by recent dynamics, 
defined by specific events and trends from PRC-U.S. normalization in 1979 until 2001. 
Shirley Kan highlights how “U.S. policy changed in 1981 to remove the ban on arms 
sales to China; …[however,]…the United States suspended mil-to mil contacts and arm 
sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in June 1989.”54 Kan continues: “In the 
fall of 1993, the Clinton Administration began to re-engage the PRC leadership; 
…however, results were limited and the military relationship did not regain the closeness 
reached in the 1980s.”55 Kan concludes that vacillating “bilateral relations affected mil-
to-mil contacts, which had close ties in 1997–1998 and 2000, but were marred by the 
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis…[and the]…mistaken NATO bombing of the PRC 
embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999.”56 These trends highlight festering PRC-U.S. tensions 
leading up to the 2001 confrontations. 
51 “Semaphore: July 2006, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium,” Royal Australian Navy, accessed 
April 28, 2014, http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-july-2006. 
52 Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 9. 
53 Shannon Tiezzi, “Small But Positive Signs at Western Naval Symposium,” The Diplomat, April 24, 
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/small-but-positive-signs-at-western-pacific-naval-symposium/. 
54 Shirley A. Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues For Congress,” Congressional Research 




                                                 
 PRC-U.S. friction surrounding the EEZ also increased in the years prior to the 
2001 confrontations. First, the PRC attempted to assert greater control over its EEZ in the 
late 1990s, evidenced by its passage of the “Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-
Related Maritime Scientific Research,” enacted on October 1, 1996, which requires 
maritime activities to be “subject to the approval of the state administrative department of 
marine affairs.”57 A second declaration through which the PRC attempted to enhance 
control over its EEZ was the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf,” enacted on June 26, 1998, “to ensure that the 
People’s Republic of China shall exercise its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its 
exclusive economic zone and its continental shelf and safeguard its national maritime 
rights and interests.”58 Bernard Cole also notes the China Maritime Surveillance service 
(CMS) “was created on 19 October 1998…and is responsible for enforcing laws and 
order within China’s territorial waters, EEZ, and shore,”59 among other missions. Lastly, 
Dennis Blair and David Bonfili highlight that “for years before the…[EP-3]…incident, 
the United States had conducted reconnaissance flights off the coast of China.”60 
However, in April 2001, the Washington Post reported:  
In the second half of last year, the U.S. military stepped up its 
reconnaissance flights, sending planes four or five times a week about 50 
miles off the Chinese coast, according to a Chinese military official. He 
maintained that this was an increase over the years 1997–99, when the 
average had been about 200 flights annually. The Chinese response has 
been to scramble jet fighters to intercept and fly alongside about one of 
every three reconnaissance flights, a U.S. Navy official said. In recent 
months that rate continued, keeping pace with the stepped-up U.S. flights. 
But there was a key difference, he said: The Chinese jets came closer and 
57 “Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research,” Asian Legal 
Information Institute, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/potaofmsr735/. 
The Asian Legal Information Institute is a non-profit website providing legal information for 27 Asian 
nations. 
58 “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental 
Shelf,” Asian Legal Information Institute, accessed May 19, 2014, 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/lotprocoteezatcs790/. 
59 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea, 2nd ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 81. 
60 Dennis C. Blair and David B. Bonfili, “Managing Sino-American Crises,” 378. 
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 closer. After one fighter came within 30 feet of a U.S. plane on Christmas 
Day, the United States filed a formal diplomatic protest in Beijing.61 
This account reveals an established trend of airborne intercepts prior to early 2001; 
however, starting in December 2000, these intercepts became hazardous, indicating 
further PRC pressure towards U.S. surveillance activities. Recent dynamics expose 
intersecting patterns of festering bilateral tensions, rising PRC assertion over its EEZ, and 
increasing U.S. reconnaissance activities, revealing a convergence of pressures in the 
maritime domain that likely impacted the 2001 surveillance confrontations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The 2001 incidents were significantly shaped by the progression of PRC-U.S. 
maritime relations. This evolution revealed a basis of PRC-U.S. tensions involving 
adverse historical circumstances, divergent interpretations of international norms, 
inadequate bilateral and multilateral initiatives, and the converging pressures of recent 
dynamics. Upon this volatile basis, two nearly simultaneous surveillance confrontations 
transpired within the PRC’s EEZ in early 2001, which are explored in the following 
chapter. 
61 Thomas Ricks, “Anger over Flights Grew in Past Year,” Washington Post, April 7, 2001, 
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2001/apr/07/anger_over_flights/. 
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 III. USNS BOWDITCH AND EP-3 CASE STUDY (2001) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2001 USNS Bowditch and EP-3 incidents comprise the first incident case 
study. Upon the volatility of PRC-U.S. maritime relations, the 2001 incidents are 
contrasted from both nations’ perspectives for potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior. 
This assessment suggests that operational opportunism was likely an instigator of the 
2001 confrontations. 
B. USNS BOWDITCH INCIDENT (MARCH 23, 2001) 
The 2001 harassment of USNS Bowditch in the East China Sea marked the first 
reported surveillance confrontation with U.S. surveillance vessels in the PRC’s EEZ. This 
incident featured a specific operational objective of PLAN harassment, supporting 
operational opportunism as a likely driver of the PRC’s behavior. U.S. and PRC 
perceptions of the USNS Bowditch incident are contrasted to reconstruct the encounter. 
1. U.S. Perceptions 
U.S. accounts indicate that the PRC strongly asserted its claims when it 
challenged USNS Bowditch in early 2001, but tensions were initially placated because 
the U.S. vessel left the EEZ. According to Pedrozo, on March 23, 2001, Bowditch “was 
conducting routine military survey operations in China’s claimed exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) in the Yellow Sea when it was ‘aggressively confronted’ by a Chinese 
Jianheu [or Jianghu] III-class frigate.”62 Kan describes how the “frigate passed as close 
as 100 yards”63 to Bowditch. Pedrozo states that Bowditch was threatened and “ordered 
to leave China’s EEZ,”64 and “being an unarmed naval auxiliary vessel, Bowditch 
62 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101. 
63 Shirley A. Kan, “China’s Military and Security Developments,” Congressional Research Service 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, January 20, 2011), 5. 
64 Pete Pedrozo, “The U.S.-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster,” Journal of 
National Security Law and Policy, (August 29, 2012): 211, http://jnslp.com/2012/08/29/the-u-s-china-
incidents-at-sea-agreement-a-recipe-for-disaster/. 
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 changed course and left the area as instructed.”65 USNS Bowditch and a PLAN Jianghu 
Frigate are depicted in Figure 2. Kan also relays that “a PLA reconnaissance plane 
shadowed [Bowditch].”66 Amidst this unprecedented confrontation, USNS Bowditch left 
the area of contention, temporarily pacifying growing tensions.  
  
Figure 2.  USNS Bowditch and PLAN Jianghu III Frigate.67 
After the engagement, the U.S. took measures to preserve freedom of EEZ 
navigation norms. Pedrozo describes how “a few days later, the U.S. Embassy filed a 
strongly worded diplomatic protest with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”68 This 
was supplemented by a reassertion of the status quo, as Pedrozo states: “Bowditch 
returned to the area of the encounter, this time with an armed U.S. escort, to continue its 
mission.”69 According to Kraska and Pedrozo, in response to the U.S. protest, “Beijing 
indicated that U.S. military survey operations in the EEZ posed a threat to its national 
security and required China’s consent.”70 Both sides continued to assert their positions as 
evidenced by Kan’s statement that “the PLA’s harassment of the USNS Bowditch 
65 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101. 
66 Kan, “China’s Military and Security,” 5. 
67 Oceanographic Survey Ships, Military Sealift Command, accessed April 28, 2014, 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/ships.asp?ship=17; Type 053 Jianghu-class Frigates, 
GlobalSecurity.org, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/jianghu-
gallery.htm. 
68 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101. 
69 Ibid. 
70 James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law (Leiden, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 287. 
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 continued for months after March 2001,”71 supporting operational opportunism as a 
driver of the PRC’s behavior during this period. 
2. PRC Perceptions 
PRC sources portray that the 2001 USNS Bowditch incident resulted from its 
unauthorized operations within the EEZ at a time of heightened sensitivity. The Beijing 
Ribao claims Bowditch was observing a PLA submarine exercise; additionally, in 
response to an April 2, 2001 Washington Post report that a PLAN frigate “was carrying 
out ‘aggressive and provocative actions’ against the U.S. reconnaissance ship and 
directing its fire control radar at the Bowditch,”72 Beijing Ribao makes the statement that 
“The Huangshi [FFG 535] did not aim fire at the Bowditch. The Bowditch was forced to 
leave the area, and the PLA sent a reconnaissance plane to following it.”73  
The 2001 USNS Bowditch incident displayed an unprecedented PLAN 
confrontation with a U.S. surveillance vessel operating with the PRC’s EEZ. PRC 
sources claimed an operational basis for this encounter, supporting operational 
opportunism as a likely driver of its behavior. Although this would have been a 
significant encounter in and of itself, its impact was soon overshadowed by the EP-3 
incident’s political fallout. 
C. EP-3 INCIDENT (APRIL 1, 2001) 
On April 1, one week after the Bowditch incident, a U.S. Navy EP-3 and a PLAN 
F-8 Finback accidentally collided in the South China Sea, killing the F-8 pilot and forcing 
the EP-3 to land in the PRC, resulting in a diplomatic crisis. This incident was preceded 
by several months of hazardous PLAN intercepts, suggesting that operational 
opportunism was likely a driver of the PRC’s behavior, in which local commanders 
71 Kan, “China’s Military and Security,” 5. 
72 Ren Yujun, “U.S. Military Planes and Ships Frequently Carry out Provocations at China’s 
Threshold; Today They Have Dispatched Three Destroyers to Cruise off Hainan,” Renmin Ribao, April 3, 
2001, Open Source Center, (CPP20010403000058), Renmin Ribao is the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee’s daily newspaper.’ 
73 Ibid. 
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 challenged U.S. surveillance assets whenever the opportunity appeared. U.S. and PRC 
perceptions of the incident are contrasted to reconstruct this encounter. 
1. U.S. Perceptions 
The PRC’s pattern of airborne intercepts became hazardous in December 2000, 
and many U.S. accounts present this as a basis of the April 2001 EP-3 incident. Blair and 
Bonfili highlight this growing trend: “in the year before the collision…a new and 
dangerous pattern had emerged. Chinese fighters flying from Hainan Island began flying 
dangerous intercepts, frequently crossing close ahead of the U.S. planes.”74 Kan indicates 
an intensification of this pattern in December 2001, as indicated by a formal protest: 
“according to the Pentagon, the PLA began its recent pattern of aggressive interceptions 
of U.S. reconnaissance flights in December, 2000. The United States lodged a formal 
protest…on December 28, 2000.”75 The increasingly confrontational posture of PLAN 
aircraft is also confirmed by the firsthand accounts of Lieutenant (LT) Shane Osborn, the 
EP-3 pilot during the incident: “They had become more aggressive over the recent 
months. They’d been closer and closer, but they’d never been that close, on the side of 
our wing.”76 This extended period of airborne confrontations by the PLAN supports 
operational opportunism as a likely driver of the PRC’s behavior, in which local 
commanders challenged U.S. surveillance assets whenever the opportunity appeared. 
Amidst this backdrop of increased engagements, the accidental collision occurred 
on April 1. Kan states: “Shortly after 9:00 am on April 1, 2001…a U.S. Navy EP3E (Ares 
II) turboprop reconnaissance aircraft and a…(PLAN) F-8II jet fighter accidentally 
collided in international airspace about 70 miles off of the PRC’s Hainan Island.”77 LT 
Osborn describes the collision, stating: “He came up on us twice, and both times were 
really close…I just knew he was going to hit us because he wasn’t stable. He was all 
74 Blair, “The April 2001,” 378. 
75 Shirley Kan et al., “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy 
Implications,” Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2001), 14. 
76 Shane Osborn, Interview, Frontline, CBS, Fall 2001, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/china/interviews/osborn.html. 
77 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 1. 
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 over. The third time, you heard screams coming from the back as he came and he pitched 
up into us.”78 Following the incident, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
described how the PRC fighter likely lost control, stating: “The Chinese jets ‘are not 
designed to fly’ at such low speeds, Rumsfeld said, in explaining the jet’s instability.”79 
U.S. accounts of the collision reveal that the incident was likely the result of an 
unintentional lapse in tactical control by the F-8 pilot amidst an established trend of 
hazardous airborne intercepts. 
The collision resulted in the F-8 pilot’s death and the EP-3 making an emergency 
landing on Hainan Island, China. Kraska and Pedrozo describe what happen to the F-8: 
“The pilot of the Finback ejected over the South China Sea after his plane was cut in half 
by the propeller of the Orion. The Chinese pilot was never recovered and presumed 
dead.”80 The EP-3 narrowly avoided crashing, as evident by LT Osborn’s account: “we 
were in an inverted dive and we lost about 8,000 feet, upside down.”81 LT Osborn also 
describes how the aircraft depressurized, lost an engine, descended to 8,000 feet to 
maintain altitude, and after regaining control, the crew worked to destroy sensitive 
material in transit to the emergency landing on Hainan Island.82 The downed EP-3 on 
Hainan Island and a PLAN F-8II are depicted in Figure 3. Accounts of the collision 
indicate that the 24 crew of the EP-3 narrowly avoided catastrophe. 
78 Osborn, Interview. 
79 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Chinese Jet Struck Navy EP-3 Aircraft, Rumsfeld Says,” American Forces Press 
Services, April 13, 2001, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=44955. 
80 Kraska, International Maritime Security, 290. 
81 Osborn, Interview. 
82 Ibid. 
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Figure 3.  U.S. Navy EP-3 on Hainan Island and a PLAN–F-8II. 83 
The EP-3 incident had many bilateral implications for PRC-U.S. relations. U.S. 
sources assert that PRC civil-military dynamics skewed its understanding of the incident; 
consequently, blame was placed upon the U.S. and the release of the EP-3 crew became 
tied to demands for a formal apology. Susan Shirk states: “The information on the 
accident came from the Hainan naval air base, whose interest was in protecting its own 
pilots from blame. The PLA said unequivocally, just as it had in the Belgrade embassy 
bombing, that the American military had caused the incident. The government adopted 
the military version as the official version of the incident.”84 Kan outlines several PRC-
U.S. disagreements, including: “the cause of the accident, the release of the crew and 
plane, whether Washington would ‘apologize,’…the PRC’s right to inspect the EP-3, 
[and] for the right of U.S. and other nations’ aircraft to fly in international airspace near 
China.”85 Shortly after the incident, CNN reported that by April 2, the U.S. dispatched 
three destroyers to a position 150 miles east of Hainan Island.86 The PRC released the 
EP-3 crew on April 12 “out of humanitarian considerations.”87 Additionally, CNN 
indicated that the U.S. soon reasserted the status quo by resuming reconnaissance flights 
83 “U.S. Resumes Spy Plane Flights,” BBC News, May 7, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/1317489.stm; Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 16. 
84 Susan L. Shirk, Fragile Superpower (Oxford: University Press, 2007), 235. 
85 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 1. 
86 “Grounded in Hainan,” CNN Insight Transcripts, April 2, 2001, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0104/02/i_ins.00.html. 
87 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 3–5. 
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 on May 7, which were monitored by PRC aircraft at a safe distance.88 According to Kan, 
an agreement to return the aircraft was announced on May 29, and a Russian transport 
aircraft removed the disassembled plane slightly more than three months after the 
collision, on July 3.89 Figure 4 depicts the disassembled EP-3’s departure from Hainan 
Island. 
 
Figure 4.  Photo of the EP-3 being loaded onto a Russian AN-124.90 
2. PRC Perceptions 
PRC sources also indicate a period of increased tensions prior to the April 1 
incident, supporting operational opportunism as a likely driver of its behavior. The 
People’s Daily outlines two previous airborne incidents in early March 2001, 
collaborating an established trend of heightened airborne tensions along the PRC’s 
maritime periphery: “The first occurred at noon on 6 March, when two U.S. high-altitude 
reconnaissance planes from Okinawa flew over the Yellow Sea to carry out 
reconnaissance on submarines of China’s North Sea Fleet engaged in a strategic exercise. 
China’s Jinan Military Region immediately scrambled four Jian-7s to intercept and warn 
88 Chris Plante, “U.S. Quietly Resumes Surveillance Flights Off China,” CNN, 15 May 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/U.S./05/15/us.china.plane/. 
89 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 7–8. 
90 Ibid. 
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 them, whereupon the U.S. planes turned around and left.”91 A second, similar incident 
occurred the following day: 
In the early morning of 7 March, two formations of U.S. planes left their 
base in Japan, each formation consisting of one reconnaissance plane with 
2 F-15 fighters as escorts; they flew around in the vicinity of the 
international airspace center line of the East China sea to test air defense 
reaction in east China. When the U.S. planes approached the center line, a 
Chinese mobile radar locked onto them; the East Sea Fleet then dispatched 
two formations, each consisting of two SU-27s and two Jian-7s to 
intercept; seeing that they were intercepted, the U.S. planes turned around 
and flew back to Japan.92 
PRC media sources collaborate heightened tensions in the weeks prior to the April 1 
collision, supporting operational opportunism as a driver of the PRC’s behavior. 
Contrary to U.S. accounts, PRC accounts implied that the collision resulted from 
the EP-3 turning into the F-8 Finback. PRC media sources highlighted Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Zhu’s statements that: “The U.S. plane suddenly took a sharp turn toward our 
planes and the mainland. Its nose and left wing bumped against the tail of one of our 
planes, causing it to lose control and crash into the sea.”93 The PRC’s position of U.S. 
fault transferred into demands for U.S. responsibility, as the China Daily reported 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu’s April 2 statement: “The direct cause of the damage 
and crash of the Chinese jet was the sudden movement of the U.S. plane, which veered 
into the Chinese jet–contravening flight rules.”94 PRC accounts disagree over the cause 
of the incident, which aligns to Shirk’s assessment that the PLAN misreported the 
encounter.95  
91 Ren, “U.S. Military Planes.” 
92 Ibid. 
93 Zhu Bangzao, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the True Story of and China’s Stand on a U.S. 
Military Reconnaissance Plane’s Bumping Against and Destroying a Chinese Military Plane,” Beijing 
CCTV-1, April 3, 2001, Open Source Center, (CPP20010403000212) CCTV-1 is a PRC national state 
television station, broadcast in Mandarin. 
94 “Pilot Missing After U.S. Spy Jet Sparks Plane Crash,” China Daily Online, April 2, 2001, Open 
Source Center, (CPP20010402000010), China Daily is China’s official newspaper published in English’. 
95 Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 235. 
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 The 2001 EP-3 collision occurred amidst increased hazardous PLAN airborne 
intercepts. Reported encounters from December 2000 to the April 1 collision support 
operational opportunism as a likely driver of this extended behavior. This pattern appears 
to have been interrupted by the political fallout of the EP-3 incident, after which the U.S. 
resumed surveillance activities and PLAN aircraft maintained a safe distance, indicating a 
return to the pre-December 2000 status quo of more benign intercepts.96 
D. CONCLUSION 
Under the volatility of PRC-U.S. maritime development, surveillance 
confrontations plateaued in March 2001, resulting in the USNS Bowditch and EP-3 
incidents. Several months of PLAN airborne engagements prior to the EP-3 collision, the 
operational objectives tied to the harassment of USNS Bowditch, and its continued 
encounters support operational opportunism as a likely driver of the 2001 incidents. Upon 
this basis, the 2001 geopolitical landscape is explored for additional instigators of the 
PRC’s behavior. 
  
96 Plante, “U.S. Quietly Resumes”; Ricks, “Anger over Flights.” 
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 IV. GEOPOLITICAL CASE STUDY (EARLY 2001) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to volatile PRC-U.S. maritime relations, and incident-specific 
evidence supporting operational opportunism as a driver of the PRC’s behavior, several 
geopolitical conditions also likely influenced the 2001 surveillance confrontations. The 
first geopolitical case study assesses four potential geopolitical drivers coinciding with 
the 2001 encounters. Following this assessment, the PRC’s World Trade Organization 
(WTO) accession will be discussed as a deterrent to broader adversity during this period. 
This analysis suggests that these conditions likely blended to shape the 2001 
confrontations. 
B. CORRELATIVE GEOPOLITICAL DRIVERS (EARLY 2001) 
Four potential geopolitical drivers of the PRC’s behavior during the 2001 
surveillance confrontations include: domestic pressures, issue elevation, political 
reaction, and political linkage. Evidence from the surrounding landscape supports each of 
these instigators, exposing diverse influences upon the PRC’s behavior. 
1. Domestic Pressures 
PRC bureaucratic processes coincided with the 2001 surveillance confrontations, 
supporting this domestic pressure as a first potential geopolitical driver that shaped these 
encounters. Bureaucratic pressures were likely most influential near the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) session in early March 2001, limiting this factor’s viability as a 
significant driver across the entire late 2000 and early 2001 confrontations; however, 
these pressures may have shaped the timings or hype surrounding specific March 
encounters. In 2001, the annual NPC session was held from March 5 to 15.97 David 
Shambaugh outlines this meeting’s significance for the PLA, and the navy: “In March of 
every year, at the National People’s Congress, the annual national and defense budgets 
97 Guo Xiaohong, “NPC Session Fruitful,” China Internet Information Center (CIIC), last modified 
March 15, 2001, http://www.china.org.cn/english/9215.htm. The CIIC is an official PRC government site. 
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 are announced by the minister of finance. This figure (for defense) should be viewed as 
both the culmination and initiation of the centralized defense budget process. That is, the 
total figure announced is both the outcome of a year-long bidding and negotiating process 
and the catalyst for the next budget cycle.”98 The PLAN’s budget is linked to security 
dynamics. Redden and Saunders outline several PLAN benefits from defending maritime 
sovereignty, including: “clout in inter-service debates…public support, and…increased 
resources for naval modernization.”99 According to The Economist, on March 6, 2001, 
the PRC “announced an increase of 18% in its defence budget, the biggest for 20 
years.”100 Coincidentally, two consecutive airborne incidents occurred on March 6 and 7, 
2001, just as this figure was published; these incidents may have been viewed as 
peripheral maritime security threats, supplying a degree of political justification for this 
budget or clout for the next “bidding and negotiating process” about to commence.101 
Although less synchronous, the 2001 Bowditch incident occurred just over one week after 
the 2001 NPC’s conclusion, also supporting bureaucratic domestic pressures as a driver 
of the PRC’s behavior during this encounter. However, bureaucratic pressures were likely 
less relevant when the hazardous intercepts began in December 2000, or during the April 
1 intercept that led to the EP-3 incident, exposing the limitations of this assertion. 
2. Issue Elevation 
Shifting PRC-U.S. relations under the new Bush presidency correlated to the late 
2000 and early 2001 broader period of surveillance confrontations, supporting issue 
elevation as a second potential geopolitical driver across these encounters. Although no 
particular incident can be firmly tied to bilateral discussions prior to the fallout of the 
accidental EP-3 collision on April 1, correlative evidence supports this factor’s 
acceleration and shaping of the PRC’s broader pattern of harassment. Airborne intercepts 
challenging U.S. surveillance activities were an established trend, based upon national 
98  David L. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects 
(Berkeley: University of California, 2004), 205. 
99 Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 19. 
100 “The Uneasy Triangle,” The Economist, March 15, 2001, http://www.economist.com/node/532643. 
101 Ren, “U.S. Military Planes”; Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 205. 
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 differences in the maritime domain; however, the December 2000 and March 2001 
intensification of these confrontations paralleled heightened PRC-U.S. adversities 
surrounding the new Bush Presidency, supporting broad issue elevation during a period 
of enhanced political efficiency as an instigator that further accelerated this behavior.102 
A March 26 Wen Hui Bao article that was published between the 2001 incidents 
expressed PRC perceptions of instability following U.S. presidential transitions: “General 
knowledge of politics and diplomacy tells us that after the new U.S. Government took 
office, the run-in period of Sino-U.S. relations is often pregnant with destabilizing 
factors.”103 Yu Wanli also highlights a basis for the PRC’s concerns from George W. 
Bush’s November 19, 1999 campaign statement: “China should be seen as a competitor, 
not a partner and treated without ill will but without illusions.”104 A January 5, 2001 
China Daily article also stated: “people’s fears stem from Bush’s election speech, in 
which he…insisted that China is Washington’s strategic rival rather than its partner.”105 
Concerns in the PRC grew after George W. Bush’s confirmed presidency on December 
12, 2000, at the start of a period in which instabilities in PRC-U.S. relations were 
accompanied by shifting bilateral policy dynamics. In late 2000, the origin of this period 
coincided with a hazardous escalation of airborne intercepts, supporting that the pattern 
of surveillance confrontations over the ensuing months might have been a broad initiative 
to elevate maritime surveillance issues during the start of this dynamic period of 
enhanced political efficiency.106 
102 Ricks, “Anger over Flights.” 
103 Yang Jiemian: “Expanding Consensus, Narrowing Differences, Stabilizing Relations, and 
Continuing To Advance–Analyzing Vice Premier Qian’s U.S. Visit,” Wen Hui Bao, March 26, 2001, Open 
Source Center (CPP20010330000034). The Wen Hui Bao is a daily newspaper published in Shanghai, 
which has an intellectual audience across the PRC. 
104 Yu Wanli, “Breaking the Cycle?: Sino-U.S. Relations under George W. Bush Administration,” in 
China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power, ed. Masafumi Iida (Tokyo: National Institute for 
Defense Studies, 2009), 84. 
105 Yan Xuetong, “Peace Must Top Bush’s Taiwan Policy,” China Daily, January 5, 2001, Open 
Source Center, (CPP20010105000015). This article is an opinion piece by the executive director of the 
Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University. 
106 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 14. 
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 After President Bush’s inauguration on January 20, 2001, several bilateral issues 
intensified in March, a month also containing an initial high-level diplomatic visit by 
Vice Premier Qian, displaying further correlation between these dynamics. While Vice 
Premier Qian’s visit specifically focused on higher-profile issues, the intensification of 
surveillance confrontations amidst other heightened adversities supports broad issue 
elevation as a driver of the PRC’s behavior. From a PRC perspective, Yu states, “in order 
to alleviate the cyclical impact brought about by George W. Bush taking office, the 
Chinese government adopted a series of active diplomatic initiatives.”107 These 
initiatives included a diplomatic visit by PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen and visits by 
two former ambassadors in February and March 2001 “to communicate with the U.S. 
government and people, nevertheless, all these diplomatic efforts were soon covered by 
the [EP-3 incident].”108 Vice Premier Qian met with several U.S. leaders from March 21 
to 23, including: Secretary of State Colin Powell on March 21; President Bush, Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Rice on March 22; and Vice 
President Cheney on March 23.109 The 2001 Bowditch incident also occurred on March 
23, the last day of these discussions, which largely focused on Taiwan arms sales, human 
rights, and the PRC’s WTO accession.110 There is no public record of maritime 
surveillance and sovereignty discussions during these talks, despite a period of hazardous 
intercepts and a diplomatic protest in December. These dynamics weaken issue elevation 
directed towards this this meeting as a driver of specific 2001 surveillance confrontations. 
However, parallels between PRC-U.S. political adversities in December 2000 and March 
2001, and the intensification of these encounters on top of a pre-established pattern of 
intercepts based on national disagreements, supports issue elevation as a driver that 
shaped the PRC’s behavior across this period of enhanced political efficiency. 
107 Yu, “Breaking the Cycle,” 86. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Vice Premier Qian Qichen Visits the United States of America, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, accessed 16 March 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3755/3756/3786/.  
110 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; Yang, “Expanding Consensus.” Glaser, “U.S. China 
Relations.”  
 32 
                                                 
 3. Political Reaction 
Adverse PRC responses toward several U.S. human rights initiatives correlated to 
the March 2001 surveillance confrontations, supporting a political reaction as a third 
potential geopolitical driver that shaped these encounters. This instigator may have 
shaped the timing or hype surrounding specific incidents under a pre-established pattern 
of U.S. surveillance harassment, signaling dissatisfaction or shifting focus away from this 
issue through the redirection of political and media attention. However, the 
intensification of hazardous intercepts in December 2000 is likely unrelated, and no 
particular encounter can be firmly tied to this driver, revealing the limitations of this 
assertion. On January 24, just days into the Bush Presidency, State Department 
Spokesman Boucher “condemned the crackdown on Falun Gong and called on China to 
release all religious and political prisoners.”111 Bonnie Glaser highlights that on February 
26, 2001, the State Department issued a PRC human rights report outlining: “China’s 
worsening human rights…[and that]…the U.S. will introduce a resolution on China’s 
human rights practices at the March [United Nations Commission on Human Rights] 
UNCHR meeting in Geneva.”112 These initial developments underscore several PRC-
U.S. human rights tensions emerging shortly into the Bush presidency as a basis of 
developing adversity surrounding this issue. 
PRC-U.S. human rights tensions intensified in late March 2001, supporting a 
political reaction as a driver that may have shaped these later confrontations. Glaser states 
that on March 20, “the Senate passes by unanimous consent a resolution that calls on the 
U.S. to take the lead in organizing multilateral support to obtain passage of a resolution 
condemning Beijing’s human rights violations in China and Tibet.”113 A second human 
rights initiative, House of Congress Resolution (H.Con.Res.) 73, targeted the 2008 
Beijing Olympics on March 21. This resolution was passed during Vice Premier Qian’s 
111 “China Tells U.S. to Butt Out,” CBS News, January 25, 2001, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-tells-us-to-butt-out/. 
112 Bonnie S. Glaser, “U.S.-China Relations: First Contact: Qian Qichen Engages in Wide-Ranging, 
Constructive Talks With President Bush and Senior U.S. Officials,” Comparative Connections 3, vol. 1, 
(April 2001): 32, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0101q.pdf. 
113 Ibid. 
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 meetings, and just two days before the Bowditch incident, stating: “Expressing the sense 
of Congress that the 2008 Olympic Games should not be held in Beijing unless the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China releases all political prisoners, ratifies the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and observes internationally 
recognized human rights.”114 On March 23, 2001, the same day as the Bowditch incident, 
PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi responded: “China is firmly opposed to the 
attempts by some U.S. legislators to block Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic 
games…such a farce must meet with rejection from people across the world and people 
of sports circles from all countries who uphold justice.”115 The precise correlation of the 
Bowditch incident and this initiative’s political fallout supports a political reaction as a 
driver that may have shaped the pre-established trend of surveillance harassment during 
this encounter. 
On March 25, between the 2001 incidents, President Jiang stated: “It is entirely 
politically biased to call China a country without democracy and freedoms simply 
because China’s democracy and political systems differ from those in the West.”116 
Rosemary Foot also highlights that “not long into his term Bush sponsored a new 
resolution at the UNCHR condemning China’s human-rights record.”117 PRC sources 
describe this initiative, which occurred between the 2001 incidents: “On March 26, 2001, 
the U.S. put forward a proposal expressing concerns about ‘human rights’ in China at a 
session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, the 11th such 
proposal from the United States since 1990. As previously, the motion failed.”118 This 
114 H.Con.Res.73–107th Congress (2001–2002), Library of Congress, accessed March 16, 2014, 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-concurrent-
resolution/73?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22107+H.CON.RES.73%22%5D%7D. 
115 “China FM Spokesman Condemns U.S. Congressional Effort to Thwart Beijing Olympic Bid,” 
Xinhua, March 23, 2001, Open Source Center, (CPP20010323000130) Xinhua is China’s official English 
news service, which is based in Beijing. 
116 Wu Qimin, “President Jiang Zemin Talks About Sino-U.S. Relations, Motherland’s Reunification, 
Reform, and Opening Up,” Renmin Ribao, March 26, 2001, Open Source Center (CPP20010326000035). 
117 Rosemary Foot, “Bush, China and Human Rights,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 176, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396330312331343546. 
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 second initiative was just days prior to the accidental EP-3 collision, supporting a 
political reaction as a driver which may have further shaped the PRC’s behavior in the 
period surrounding the 2001 encounters. Finally, Foot states that “the [Bush] 
administration began to develop a more nuanced policy”119 towards PRC human rights 
reforms following the EP-3 incident. Several March 2001 correlations between PRC-U.S. 
human rights tensions and the surveillance confrontations support a political reaction as a 
driver that may have influenced the PRC’s behavior during these encounters. This driver 
could have broadened or intensified the established pattern of harassment towards U.S. 
surveillance assets to signal dissatisfaction or shift focus away from these emerging 
human rights initiatives by redirecting political and media attention. However, this driver 
cannot be firmly linked to any encounter, and was most likely unrelated to the 
establishment of the broader pattern of hazardous airborne intercepts, exposing the 
limitations of this assertion. 
4. Political Linkage 
Taiwan arms sales tensions correlated to the late March and early April 2001 
surveillance confrontations, supporting a political linkage as a fourth potential 
geopolitical driver that shaped these encounters. The initial establishment of hazardous 
intercepts occurred well prior to an increase in PRC-U.S. Taiwan arms sales tensions in 
March and April 2001, and there is no firm evidence connecting this driver to specific 
encounters or of its political leveraging; however, these tensions could have influenced 
the pre-established pattern of encounters to enhance the PRC’s clout towards this issue. 
Robert Art describes the “fungibility of force,” through which political linkage functions: 
“linkage politics enhances the advantages of being powerful and boosts the fungibility of 
force by enabling it to cross domains.”120 The 1979 Taiwan Relation Act’s (TRA) 
governs U.S.-Taiwan arms sales, and Kan outlines the annual basis around which these 
sales functioned in 2001: “successive Administrations used a process in determining arms 
sales to Taiwan that became institutionalized as annual rounds of talks with Taiwan 
119 Foot, “Bush, China and,” 177. 
120 Robert J. Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” in The Use of Force: Military Power and International 
Politics, eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 19. 
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 authorities consisting of several phases leading up to final meetings usually in April.”121 
The first U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talk under President Bush, and last to follow this annual 
pattern, was scheduled for April 24, 2001, weeks after the confrontations.122 Prior to this 
meeting, from March 14 to 17, Admiral Blair, Commander of Pacific Command 
(PACOM), visited the PRC “to discuss military activities and plans of the PLA and 
PACOM, exchange views and enhance mutual understanding, discuss Taiwan, and stress 
the inclusion rather than the exclusion of China in multilateral activities.”123 On March 
14, General Fu Quanyou, Chief of Staff of the PLA, “urged the Bush administration ‘to 
stop arms sales to Taiwan immediately so as to avoid damaging Sino-U.S. relations,’”124 
displaying growing PRC-U.S. tensions surrounding this issue. 
During Vice Premier Qian’s March 21 meeting with Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, he stressed that Taiwan was the “core question in China-U.S. relations…[and] it 
is China’s hope that the U.S. side can handle the question of arms sales to Taiwan…so as 
to save damages to China-U.S. relations.”125 A March 26 Wen Hui Bao article, published 
after Vice Premier Qing’s meetings, reported that President Bush, “still indicated that the 
United States had yet to make a final decision on the arms sale.”126 Taiwan tensions 
continued through Vice Premier Qian’s meetings and the Bowditch incident, evidenced 
by PRC President Jiang’s March 26 statement: “Over the years, the United States has 
never ceased selling advanced weapons to Taiwan. It has recognized the one-China 
principle and made commitments to the government and people of China. But at the same 
time, it has sold large quantities of advanced weapons to Taiwan. This has in effect 
121 Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process,” Congressional Research Service 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, June 5, 2001), 1. 
122 Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990,” Congressional Research Service 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, September 28, 2001), summary. 
123 Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts,” 53. 
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 abetted the separatist activities for ‘Taiwan independence.’”127 The 2001 coincidence 
between the surveillance confrontations and growing tensions leading to the first Taiwan 
arms sales talks under the Bush presidency supports a political linkage as a driver that 
may have influenced the PRC’s behavior. This factor may have shaped the pre-
established pattern of surveillance harassment to enhance the PRC’s fungible political 
power. However, even though this driver correlates to the late March confrontations, it 
cannot be firmly linked to any encounter, there is no evidence that linkage politics 
occurred, and it was not likely present in the establishment of the extended pattern of 
hazardous airborne intercepts, exposing the limitations of this assertion. 
C. A DETERRENT TO ADVERSITY: THE PRC’S WTO ACCESSION (2001) 
In contrast to several potential drivers of PRC-U.S. tensions that may have shaped 
the 2001 confrontations, the final segment of the PRC’s WTO accession also transpired 
in early 2001, supporting its deterrence of broader adversity during this period. 
Cooperative PRC-U.S. efforts surrounding this issue likely mitigated adversity following 
these encounters. China became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1948, but after the 1949 revolution the Western-recognized government 
on Taiwan renounced membership; in 1986 the PRC “notified the GATT of its wish to 
resume its status as a GATT contracting party.”128 Morrison highlights the importance of 
WTO membership for the PRC’s economic power recognition, rule-influence, dispute 
resolution, reform legitimization, and Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) and 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status with the U.S.; consequently, “the United States has 
played a central role in China’s WTO accession process.”129 Prior to Bush’s presidency, 
President Clinton signed “the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 in October…paving the 
127 Wu, “President Jiang Zemin Talks.” 
128 World Trade Organization Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s Entry, World Trade 
Organization, last Modified September 17, 2001, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm. 
129 Wayne M. Morrison, “China and the World Trade Organization,” Congressional Research Service 
(Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2001), 2. 
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 way for China to join the World Trade Organization in 2001.”130 These circumstances 
underscore a foundation of cooperation around this issue in early 2001, which likely 
deterred broader adversity. 
PRC WTO accession efforts persisted through this period. Kan states the WTO 
Working Party “met in January 2001, and reportedly made some progress, although a 
final agreement was not reached…if China does not gain WTO accession by June 
2001…President Bush will need to issue a waiver…in order to continue China’s NTR 
status for an additional year.”131 In spite of these obstacles, cooperative progress for 
accession remained the focus. During Vice Premier Qian’s visit, President Bush stated: 
“the United States supports China’s entry into the world trade body at an early date.”132 
Glaser also highlights an exchange reported by Xinhua, between Chinese trade negotiator 
Long Yongtu and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, alongside Vice Premier 
Qian’s meetings: “The two officials conducted ‘positive and constructive’ talks on 
China’s accession to the WTO. Both sides reportedly reaffirmed that China’s early 
accession will be conducive not only to China and to the United States, but also to 
strengthening the WTO and the global multilateral economic system.”133 Shortly after the 
EP-3 incident, Kan highlighted potential implications for the PRC’s WTO accession 
amidst the political crisis: “A further worsening of political ties could negatively affect 
the business climate in China for U.S. firms and disrupt negotiations over China’s WTO 
accession.”134 This dynamic highlights the risks involved in surveillance confrontations, 
in which WTO accession cooperation was nearly undermined by the accidental EP-3 
collision and subsequent political crisis. Early 2001 dynamics surrounding the PRC’s 
130 U.S. Relations With China (1949–Present), Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 22, 
2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-relations-china-1949---present/p17698.  
131 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 24–25. 
132 U.S. President Meets Vice Premier Qian Qichen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, last modified March 23, 2001, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3755/3756/3786/t19333.shtml. 
133 Glaser, “U.S.-China Relations,” 28.  
134 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft,” summary. 
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 WTO accession suggest it likely served as a deterrent to adversity in PRC-U.S. relations 
surrounding the surveillance confrontations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations, the specifics of each incident, 
and several geopolitical factors, all defined the 2001 surveillance confrontations. 
Domestic pressures, issue elevation, political reaction, and political linkage were four 
potential geopolitical drivers that likely influenced the PRC’s behavior, while the PRC’s 
WTO accession may have deterred broader adversity. Table 1 highlights several 
significant events in PRC-U.S. relations surrounding the 2001 surveillance 
confrontations. The 2009 confrontations are explored across the same dimensions, 
exposing parallel trends for comparative analysis. 
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 Table 1.   Chronology of Early 2001 PRC-U.S. Relations.135 
Date: Event Description: 
Dec 2000 Hazardous PLAN airborne encounters emerge over an established trend of intercepts. 
Dec 12 George W. Bush declared presidential victor. 
Dec 28 U.S. formal protest against PRC airborne assertion. 
Jan 17, 2001 WTO working group meeting. 
Jan 20 President George W. Bush inaugurated. 
Jan 24 U.S. State Dept. Spokesman Boucher condemns the PRC’s Falun Gong crackdown. 
Feb 26 U.S. State Dept. releases adverse PRC human rights report and UNCHR intentions. 
Mar 5–15 Annual NPC meeting. 
Mar 6 The PRC announces a defense spending increase of 18%, the largest in 20 years. 
Mar 6–7 Two notable PRC-U.S. airborne encounters. 
Mar 14–17 Adm. Blair, Commander of PACOM visits the PRC for discussions. 
Mar 14 PLA Chief of General Staff Fu’s comments against U.S.-Taiwan arms sales 
Mar 20 Senate Resolution passed for broader U.S. leadership on PRC human rights reforms. 
Mar 21–23 Meetings held between Vice Premier Qian and U.S. leaders in Washington. 
Mar 21 H.Con.Res. 73 passed toward Beijing Olympic bid for PRC human rights conditions. 
Mar 23 PRC Spokesman Sun Yuxi responds critically to human rights resolution.  
Mar 23 USNS Bowditch incident. 
Mar 25 PRC President Jiang indicates enduring Taiwan and human rights tensions. 
Mar 26 U.S. human rights proposal toward the PRC at UNCHR. 
Apr 1 EP-3/F-8 Collision. 
Apr 24 U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks. 
 
135 Ricks, “Anger over Flights”; Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft,” 1, 24–25; “China Tells U.S.”; Glaser, 
“U.S.-China Relations,” 32; Guo, “NPC Session Fruitful”; “The Uneasy Triangle”; Ren, “U.S. Military 
Planes”; Kan, U.S.-China Military,” 53; “China May Determine”; Yang, “Expanding Consensus”; 
H.Con.Res.73-107th Congress; “China FM Spokesman Condemns”; Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; 
Wu, “President Jiang Zemin Talks”; Lu, “Chronology of China-U.S.”; Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms,” 
summary. 
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 V. PRC-U.S. MARITIME DEVELOPMENT (2001–2009) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To identify potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior during the 2009 surveillance 
confrontations, the development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations from 2001 to early 2009 
is outlined. This progression is defined by the continued evolution of both nations’ norms 
in the offshore domain. This setting is explored to early 2009 as a foundation of the 
second set of incidents. 
B. PRC-U.S. MARITIME RELATIONS (2001–2009) 
The development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations to early 2009 was influenced by 
several interwoven factors, including: international norms, bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives, and recent dynamics. The historical circumstances discussed in Chapter II 
maintain a similar influence as they did in 2001. Each of these sub-sets is explored, 
revealing a relative easing of PRC-U.S. maritime tensions between the 2001 and 2009 
surveillance confrontations. 
1. International Norms 
The 2009 surveillance confrontations were impacted by the development of 
international norms during the 2000s, which consisted of improved PRC-U.S. relations in 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and attempts to further integrate the PRC into the existing 
international order to promote stability. The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. occurred just over 
five months after the 2001 maritime incidents, creating opportunities for advancing PRC-
U.S. relations. Glaser highlights “after 9/11, the U.S. intensified its efforts to combat 
terrorism at home and abroad, and sought to cooperate with a large number of countries, 
including China.”136 Shirk states that in the post 9/11 era, PRC President “Jiang Zemin 
realized that China had been handed its own period of strategic opportunity that it could 
exploit to improve relations with the United States and accelerate its domestic economic 
136 Bonnie S. Glaser, “The Diplomatic Relationship: Substance and Process,” in Tangled Titans, ed. 
David Shambaugh (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 163. 
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 development.”137 Zhang Tuosheng highlights three examples of the PRC’s international 
integration during this period, including its WTO membership in late 2001, Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) involvement, and the Beijing Olympics of 2008, which 
all “made China eager to maintain a basically stable and sound relationship with the 
United States.”138 The PRC’s further integration into and acceptance of international 
norms across the 2000s enabled advancement of many aspects of PRC-U.S. relations, 
dampening bilateral tensions. 
2. Bilateral and Multilateral Initiatives 
Bilateral and multilateral initiatives also progressed between 2001 and 2009, 
which influenced the 2009 surveillance confrontations. Relations were initially strained 
by the EP-3 incident, particularly in the military to military sphere, as indicated by Kan: 
Rumsfeld told reporters on May 8, 2001, that he decided against visits to 
China by U.S. ships or aircraft and against social contacts, because ‘it 
really wasn’t business as usual.’ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz reported to Congress on June 8, 2001, that mil-to-mil 
exchanges for 2001 remained under review by Secretary Rumsfeld and 
exchanges with the PLA would be conducted ‘selectively and on a case-
by-case basis.’139 
Although restrained in the aftermath of the EP-3 collision, bilateral initiatives also grew 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Kan states that the PRC and U.S. resumed MMCA talks 
in Guam on September 14–15, 2001, discussing “how to avoid clashes like the one 
involving the EP-3,”140 while the Defense Consultative Talks continued on December 9–
10, 2002.141 A PRC source indicates that from October 18 to 20, 2001, President Bush 
attended the APEC summit in Shanghai, and “held a 3-hour talk on China-U.S. relations 
and [the] Taiwan issue”142 with PRC President Jiang. Additionally, Kan highlights 
137 Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 245. 
138 Zhang Tuosheng, “Managing Sino-American Crisis,” 392. 
139 Kan, “U.S.-China Military,” 2. 
140 Ibid., 62. 
141 Ibid., 63. 
142 Lu, “Chronology of China-U.S.” 
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 several bilateral interactions that indicate advancing PRC-U.S. ties across this period, 
including: a spring 2002 visit to Washington by PRC Vice President Hu Jintao; an 
October 2002 visit to Crawford, Texas by President Jiang Zemin; a 2003 visit by Defense 
Minister General Cao Gangchuan; and two January 2004 visits to China–one by General 
Richard Myers the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other by Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage.143 Kan highlights the continuation of this trend in 
the second half of the decade, including: a September 2005 visit to China by Admiral 
William Fallon, the Commander of PACOM, to improve mil-to-mil relations; an October 
2005 visit to China by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “which was long sought 
by the PLA for the perceived full resumption of the military relationship,”144 and a July 
2006 visit to the U.S. by the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
General Guo Boxiong, the PLA’s top officer.145 Bilateral initiatives reveal steadily 
repairing PRC-U.S. political relations through increased visits and dialogues in the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks. 
During this same period, the PRC made multilateral progress in the maritime 
domain with ASEAN, signing the “2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea” on November 4, 2002, in which signatories: “reaffirm their respect for 
and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China 
Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, 
including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”146 Kraska states that that this 
initiative helped to “de-escalate sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes in the South 
China Sea, …[but shows that]…after the [EP-3] incident…the Chinese government may 
have been divided on the legality of China’s claims.”147 Bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives during the 2000s reveal advancing PRC-U.S. ties following the 9/11 attacks. 
143 Kan, “U.S.-China Military,” 3. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 2–3. 
146 Declaration On the Conduct of Parties In The South China Sea, Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, accessed May 15, 2014, http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-
the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea. 
147 Kraska, “Sovereignty at Sea,” 17. 
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 3. Recent Dynamics 
The 2009 surveillance confrontations were also impacted by recent dynamics, 
which reveal fewer adverse incidents than the 1990s, indicating dampened maritime 
tensions. The only reported surveillance confrontation from 2001 to 2009 was a second 
harassment of USNS Bowditch on September 19, 2002. Kan states that in “September of 
2002, PLA patrol aircraft and ships harassed the unarmed USNS Bowditch in 
international water in the Yellow Sea. The PLA claimed the ship’s surveys violated the 
PRC’s EEZ. The two countries traded diplomatic protests.”148 The New York Times 
stated: “The Pentagon spokesman dismissed reports from a Hong Kong newspaper that 
the Bowditch had collided with a Chinese fishing boat on Sept. 19 in the Yellow Sea, 
about 60 miles off China’s coast. Ms. Zhang [a PRC Foreign Ministry spokeswoman] 
refused to confirm the report, and the mild tone of her rebuke suggested that Beijing does 
not plan to make a major issue of the incident.”149 From the PRC’s perspective, the 
Qingnian Cankao indicated that in the East China Sea on September 19, 2002, PRC 
warships and Y-8 and Y-12 aircraft monitored and warned Bowditch, a reconnaissance 
vessel shadowed it, and “a Chinese fishing vessel that was operating nearby rammed into 
the towed sonar of the ‘Bowditch’ and knocked off a hydrophone.”150 The account also 
states, “the U.S. military has intentionally maintained a low-key stance over this 
incident.”151 Regardless of whether a collision occurred, harassment generated 
diplomatic protests on both sides, but the incident appears to be divorced from significant 
geopolitical trends, supporting operational opportunism as a likely driver of the PRC’s 
behavior during this encounter. 
148 Kan, “U.S.-China Military,” 62. 
149 Erik Eckholm, “China Complains about U.S. Surveillance Ship,” New York Times, September 27, 
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/27/world/china-complains-about-us-surveillance-ship.html. 
150 Xu Bingchuan, “Chinese Fishing Boat Rams into U.S. Spy Ship; Expert on International Issues 
Says the Incident Would Not Affect Mainstream Sino-U.S. Relations,” Qingnian Cankao, September 25, 
2002, Open Source Center, (CPP20020926000031), Qingnian Cankao is a weekly Internet journal 
sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s China Youth League. 
151 Ibid. 
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 Several other recent dynamics shaped the setting in which the 2009 incidents 
occurred. According to Yu, on September 20, 2006, the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign 
affairs expressed concern to the U.S. Embassy over four survey ships in its EEZ that were 
“seriously infringing upon the ocean rights and interests of China,”152 however, neither 
harassment nor further diplomatic action resulted. Kan lists several other significant 
PRC-U.S. maritime dynamics from 2001 to 2009, including: a Song submarine’s 
approach to the USS Kitty Hawk (CVN-63) in October 2006, the PRC suspension of U.S. 
military exchanges in response to Taiwan arms sales to in October 2008, and the 
coordination of PRC-U.S. antipiracy operations near Somalia in January 2009.153 Recent 
PRC-U.S. dynamics from 2001 to 2009 indicate a period of dampened tensions in 
comparison to the previous decade. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The 2009 surveillance confrontations were shaped by the continued progression 
of PRC-U.S. maritime relations. This evolution included the enduring influences of 
adverse historical circumstances, but also witnessed the PRC’s greater alignment with 
international norms, progressing bilateral and multilateral initiatives in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks, and recent dynamics that expose a period of dampening tensions across the 
2000s. Upon this basis, two nearly simultaneous surveillance confrontations once again 
transpired within the PRC’s EEZ in early 2009, which are explored in the following 
chapter. 
  
152 Yu, Military Activities, 41. 
153 Kan, “U.S.-China Military,” 67, 70. 
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 VI. USNS VICTORIOUS AND IMPECCABLE CASE STUDY (2009) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2009 USNS Victorious and USNS Impeccable comprise the second incident 
case study. Upon an easing of PRC-U.S. maritime tensions, the 2009 incidents are 
contrasted from both nations’ perspectives for potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior. 
Sporadic encounters over a several week period suggest that operational opportunism was 
likely an instigator of the 2009 confrontations. 
B. USNS IMPECCABLE INCIDENT (MARCH 5–8, 2009) 
The 2009 harassment of USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea marked a 
strong reemergence of surveillance confrontations in the PRC’s EEZ. This incident 
occurred intermittently over a four-day period. U.S. and PRC perceptions of the USNS 
Impeccable incident are contrasted to reconstruct the encounter. 
1. U.S. Perceptions 
U.S. sources indicate that the USNS Impeccable incident began on March 5, 
2001, and intensified over the following days. The encounter started when a PLAN vessel 
crossed 100 yards in front of the USNS Impeccable’s bow, after which a PRC Y-12 
aircraft conducted 11 low passes in its vicinity, and then the PLAN vessel again crossed 
Impeccable’s bow at close range; two days later, on March 7, “a PRC intelligence 
collection ship (AGI) challenged USNS Impeccable over bridge-to-bridge radio, calling 
her operations illegal and directing Impeccable to leave the area or ‘suffer the 
consequences.’”154 These initial actions indicate escalated harassment against USNS 
Impeccable, coordinated from multiple PRC agencies in the South China Sea. 
According to U.S. accounts, the trend of coordinated harassment plateaued on 
March 8. Pedrozo describes how “on 8 March 2009, five PRC vessels–a navy intelligence 
ship, a government fisheries-patrol vessel, a state oceanographic patrol vessel, and two 
154 “RAW DATA: Pentagon Statement on Chinese Incident With U.S. Navy,” Fox News, March 9, 
2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/09/raw-data-pentagon-statement-chinese-incident-navy/. 
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 small fishing trawlers–surrounded and harassed Impeccable approximately seventy five 
miles south of Hainan Island.”155 McVadon states, “the Chinese crew also attempted to 
snag the cable for the towed array. The reports suggest danger of collision and injury.”156 
Other media accounts relay that one PRC vessel approached as its sailors waved Chinese 
flags and the Impeccable responded with fire-hoses, after which the Chinese crew 
stripped down to their underwear.157 Finally, after informing the PRC vessels that it 
intended to depart the scene, “two of the PRC vessels stopped directly ahead of USNS 
Impeccable, forcing…an emergency ‘all stop’ in order to avoid collision. They dropped 
pieces of wood in the water directly in front of Impeccable’s path.”158 Figure 5 depicts 
the PRC’s harassment of USNS Impeccable during this encounter. 
Following the confrontation, diplomatic channels were engaged, while the U.S. 
asserted its right to freedom of navigation in the EEZ, protecting the Impeccable under 
military escort. On the diplomatic front, the PRC Foreign Ministry received a formal 
protest from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, while military officials met with the PRC’s 
defense attaché at the Pentagon on March 9 to discuss the incident.159 During previously 
arranged meetings with the PRC’s Foreign Minister Yang on March 11 and 12, Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama discussed how to reduce tensions and 
increase dialogue to prevent similar future incidents.160 Lyle Goldstein states that by 
March 12: “President Obama ordered the USS Chung-Hoon [DDG-93], a guided missile 
155 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101. 
156 McVadon, “The Reckless,” 2. 
157 “China and America Spar at Sea: Naked Aggression,” The Economist, March 12, 2009, 
http://economist.com/node/13279348. 
158 “RAW DATA: Pentagon.” 
159Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Protests Chinese Shadowing in International Waters, Washington Post, 
March 10, 2009. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009–03–10/world/36873869_1_chinese-crew-
members-ocean-surveillance-ship-chinese-fighters. 
160 “Obama Calls For Improved Military Dialogue Between U.S. and China, After Naval 
Confrontation,” Fox News, March 12, 2009. http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/12/obama-calls-
improved-military-dialogue-china-naval-confrontation/. 
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 destroyer, to escort the Impeccable as it continued its mission in the South China Sea. 
Beijing did not elect to escalate the crisis by countering this deployment.”161 
 
Figure 5.  PRC vessels blocking Impeccable and attempting to snag array.162 
2. PRC Perceptions 
PRC accounts imply that the incident resulted from the Impeccable’s intrusion 
into its EEZ. On March 10, Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma responding to U.S. 
statements: 
U.S. Navy surveillance ship Impeccable violated the provisions of relevant 
international law as well as Chinese laws and regulations, conducting 
activities in China’s exclusive economic zone without Chinese permission. 
China has made solemn representations with the United States regarding 
this. We demand that the United States immediately stop related activities 
and adopt effective measures to avoid a repeat of similar incidents.163 
161 Lyle J. Goldstein, “Domestic Politics and the U.S.-China Rivalry,” in Sumit Ganguly and William 
Thompson, eds., Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-level Games (Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 56. 
162 Ann Scott Tyson, “Navy Sends Destroyer to Protect Surveillance Ship After Incident in the South 
China Sea,” Washington Post, March 13, 2009, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009–03–
13/world/36789905_1_chinese-ships-ocean-surveillance-ship-chinese-vessels; Jim Garamone, “U.S. Will 
Continue to Sail in International Waters, Official Says,” American Forces Press Services, March 10, 2009, 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=43328. 
163 Xiong Zhengyan and Hou Lijun, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman: U.S. Surveillance Ship 
‘Impeccable’ Violated International Law and Chinese Law; China Made Solemn Representations,” Xinhua, 
March 10, 2009, From Virtual Information Center, Asia-Pacific Daily News Summary, 10 March 2009, 6, 
Open Source Center (FBS20090311408799). 
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 In the same address, Foreign Minister Ma also stated: 
The related U.S. statements seriously contravene facts and confuse right 
and wrong. For China, this is completely unacceptable. Regarding the 
issue of foreign ships conducting activities in China’s exclusive economic 
zone, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the PRC Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Law, and the PRC Provisions on 
the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research all 
contain clear provisions. The Chinese government has consistently 
handled such activities strictly in accordance with the above-mentioned 
provisions.164 
The comments of PLA military officials supported official responses. Rear Admiral 
Wang Dengping, political commissar of the PLAN Armament Department stated: “Our 
civilian and military vessels have the right to do things in our exclusive economic 
zone.”165 PLAN Rear Admiral Zhang Deshun also stated, “The location where the 
confrontation occurred is our economic territory, where we have sovereignty…it’s 
nonsense that the U.S., which offends international law, should complain about us 
first.”166 PRC accounts of the USNS Impeccable incident assert that it resulted from the 
vessel’s intrusion into the PRC’s EEZ, after which its assets responded in accordance 
with its legal interpretations, supporting operational opportunism as a driver of the PRC’s 
behavior. 
 
The 2009 USNS Impeccable incident displayed a renewal of surveillance 
confrontations involving U.S. surveillance vessels operating in the PRC’s EEZ. A 
second, nearly simultaneous incident involving USNS Victorious is investigated, 
revealing similarities. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Kristie Kwok, “Beijing Says U.S. Navy Broke Law,” South China Morning Post, March 11, 2009, 
Open Source Center (CPP20090311715022). 
166 Minnie Chan, “Naval Incident Seen as a Test of U.S.’ China Policy,” South China Morning Post, 
March 11, 2009, Open Source Center (CPP20090311715031). 
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 C. USNS VICTORIOUS INCIDENT (MARCH 4 - MAY 1, 2009) 
The 2009 harassment of USNS Victorious in the East China Sea marked a parallel 
resurfacing of surveillance confrontations in the PRC’s EEZ. This incident was marked 
by sporadic confrontations spanning nearly two-months, supporting operational 
opportunism as a likely driver of the PRC’s behavior, in which local commanders 
challenged U.S. EEZ operations whenever the opportunity appeared across this period. 
U.S. and PRC perceptions of the incident are contrasted to reconstruct the encounter. 
1. U.S. Perceptions 
U.S. accounts of the USNS Victorious incident indicate that the confrontation 
began on March 4, 2009, approximately 125 nautical miles from China’s coast in the 
Yellow Sea, with sporadic encounters continuing until May 1. McVadon describes how 
on March 4, USNS Victorious, “experienced harassment by a Chinese Bureau of 
Fisheries vessel and repeated low-altitude passes by a Chinese navy maritime patrol 
aircraft.”167 Pentagon statements indicate that on the night of March 4, the Bureau of 
Fisheries vessel directed a spotlight upon the ship, passed 1400 yards in front of it 
unannounced, and a Y-12 navy maritime patrol aircraft executed 12 low level passes the 
following day, at 400 feet above and 500 yards abeam of USNS Victorious.168 Figure 6 
depicts USNS Victorious, a vessel in the same class as USNS Impeccable. U.S. accounts 
indicate that the Victorious incident was similar in disposition to the Impeccable incident, 
which occurred less than a day apart. 
167 McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1–2. 
168 “RAW DATA: Pentagon”; Barbara Starr, “Chinese Boats Harassed U.S. Ship, Officials Say,” 
CNN, May 5, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/index.html. 
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Figure 6.  USNS Victorious169 
For nearly two months following the March 4 confrontation, other similar cases of 
harassment transpired, and media sources indicate that, “after the Impeccable incidents, 
the U.S. Navy provided armed warships to escort some USNS ships in the region.”170 
The final confrontation involving USNS Victorious occurred on May 1. Similar to 
previous incidents, the PRC vessels approached USNS Victorious within 30 yards in 
what was deemed an “unsafe and dangerous” fashion; Victorious directed its fire hoses 
upon the vessels, and the harassment continued for approximately an hour until 
Victorious radioed a nearby PRC naval vessel for help, after which the harassment 
subsided.171 BBC reported that when Pentagon spokesman Whitman was asked “why the 
tone of the U.S. statement was muted this time, he said: ‘we will be developing a way 
forward to deal with this diplomatically.’”172 Sporadic encounters between USNS 
Victorious and PRC maritime assets that spanned a two-month period support operational 
opportunism as a driver of the PRC’s behavior, in which local commanders challenged 
U.S. surveillance assets whenever the opportunity appeared. 
169USNS Victorious, U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, accessed May 14, 2014, 
http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/images/photos/victorious.jpg.  
170 Starr, “Chinese Boats Harassed.” 




                                                 
 2. PRC Perceptions 
The PRC’s reactions to the USNS Victorious incident are similar to those 
following the USNS Impeccable incident. On May 6, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Ma made a similar statement in response to the May 1 Victorious incident as he did on 
March 10, after the Impeccable incident: 
When dealing with the issue of foreign vessels’ operations in China’s 
exclusive economic zone, the Chinese Government consistently and 
strictly abides by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the PRC Law 
on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Self, and the PRC 
Regulations on the Management of Foreign-Related Marine Scientific 
Research. The fact was: The U.S. naval surveillance vessel USNS 
Victorious violated the provisions of the relevant international law and 
Chinese law and regulations by entering and operating in China’s 
exclusive economic zone in the Yellow Sea without China’s prior 
permission. China has expressed its concern in this regard and urged the 
United States to take effective measures to prevent recurrence of similar 
incidents.173 
PRC accounts of the USNS Victorious incident assert that it resulted from the vessel’s 
intrusion into the PRC’s EEZ, and its assets responded in accordance with its legal 
interpretations. 
The 2009 USNS Victorious incident displayed a parallel surveillance 
confrontation involving U.S. surveillance assets operating within the PRC’s EEZ. 
Sporadic encounters over nearly two-months support operational opportunism as a likely 
driver of the PRC’s behavior across this period, in which local commanders challenged 
U.S. surveillance assets whenever the opportunity appeared. Table 2 outlines the major 
characteristics of the five surveillance confrontations covered in this study. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Under the easing tensions of PRC-U.S. maritime development between 2001 and 
2009, the PRC executed a new series of surveillance confrontations in March 2009, 
resulting in the USNS Impeccable and Victorious incidents. The sporadic nature of these 
173 “Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Answers a Reporter’s Question on the Issues of a U.S. 
Naval Surveillance Vessel that Entered and Operated in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Yellow 
Sea,” Xinhua, May 6, 2009, Open Source Center (CPP20090506073002). 
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 encounters over nearly a two-month period indicates operational opportunism as a likely 
driver of these encounters, in which local commanders challenged U.S. surveillance 
assets whenever the opportunity appeared. Upon this basis, the 2009 geopolitical 
landscape is explored for additional instigators of the PRC’s behavior. 
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 Table 2.   PRC-U.S. Surveillance Confrontations.174 
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 VII. GEOPOLITICAL CASE STUDY (EARLY 2009) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to a relative easing of maritime tensions, and incident-specific 
evidence supporting operational opportunism as a driver of the PRC’s behavior, several 
geopolitical conditions also likely influenced the 2009 surveillance confrontations. The 
second geopolitical case study assesses four potential geopolitical drivers that coincided 
with the 2009 encounters. Following this assessment, the Great Recession’s dynamics 
will be discussed as a deterrent to broader adversity during this period. This analysis 
suggests that these conditions likely blended to shape the 2009 confrontations. 
B. CORRELATIVE GEOPOLITICAL DRIVERS (EARLY 2009) 
Four potential geopolitical drivers of the PRC’s behavior during the 2009 
surveillance confrontations include: domestic pressures, issue elevation, political 
reaction, and political linkage. Evidence from the surrounding landscape supports each of 
these instigators, exposing diverse influences upon the PRC’s behavior. 
1. Domestic Pressures 
PRC bureaucratic processes and a PLAN anniversary coincided with the 2009 
surveillance confrontations, supporting domestic pressure as a first potential geopolitical 
driver that shaped these encounters. Bureaucratic pressures were likely most influential 
surrounding the NPC in early March, limiting its viability as a significant driver of the 
confrontations across the early 2009 period; however, this factor may have shaped the 
timings or hype surrounding specific early March encounters. On March 4, the same day 
that Victorious harassment commenced, and one day before the March 5 to 13 NPC 
session, the PRC announced a 14.9% military budget increase.175 On March 11, during 
escalated maritime tensions, the South China Morning Post referenced this figure in the 
175 “China to Boost Military Spending,” BBC News, March 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7922699.stm; “China’s Top Legislature Ends Annual Session, Calling for Unison Actions to 
Combat Crisis,” Xinhua, March 13, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–
03/13/content_11003441.htm. 
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 context of “China’s ambitions to become a naval power with global reach,”176 and that 
“China’s military power is growing steadily, a fact underscored by last week’s 
announcement that the Chinese defense budget will increase by nearly 15 percent this 
year despite the economic slump.”177 The 2009 PLAN budget was subject to 
Shambaugh’s annual March cycle, and Redden and Saunder’s assertion that the PLAN 
defense of maritime sovereignty promotes its modernization resources.178 Following 
these confrontations, PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma asserted that they were 
“activities in China’s exclusive economic zone without Chinese permission;”179 
therefore, these incidents were likely viewed as peripheral maritime security threats, 
supplying a degree of political justification for this budget or additional clout for the next 
“bidding and negotiating process”180 about to commence. On March 13, shortly after the 
2009 incidents, the China Daily reported that PRC President Hu spoke to PLA officers 
during the NPC, stating the need to “vigorously advance modernization of national 
defense and the military…staunchly defend national sovereignty, security and territorial 
integrity, and provide a powerful support and assurance for protecting national interests 
and broad social stability.”181 The 2009 surveillance confrontations occurred in 
conjunction with the start of the annual NPC and its accompanying PLA budgetary cycle, 
supporting bureaucratic domestic pressures as a driver that may have influenced the 
PRC’s behavior. This driver may have shaped the timing or hype related to the early 
March encounters, but was likely less relevant during the later incidents, and was not 
likely the primary driver of the broader confrontational pattern. 
Evidence supporting domestic pressures is also loosely correlated to the end of the 
2009 confrontations, which may have shaped the PRC’s behavior to enhance pride and 
176 Michael Richardson, “Ripple Effect,” South China Morning Post Online, March 11, 2009, Open 
Source Center, (CPP20090311715033). 
177 Ibid. 
178 Shambaugh, “Modernizing China’s Military,” 205; Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S. Air,” 19. 
179 Xiong, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman: U.S. Surveillance.” 
180 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 205. 
181 “From the Foreign Press,” China Daily Online, March 13, 2009, Open Source Center 
(CPP20090313968023). 
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 national support of its maritime forces surrounding the PLAN’s 60-year anniversary on 
April 23. Delegations from 29 nations visited Qingdao for this anniversary, and the 
following day, President Hu stated the PLAN “should comprehensively push forward its 
modernization to constantly enhance its capability to carry out its missions in the new 
century and new phase; …[however,]…the country’s military build-up was purely 
defense-oriented.”182 This statement occurred shortly before the final harassment against 
USNS Victorious concluded on May 1, loosely correlating domestic pressures to the later 
confrontations during this period. The NPC, PLA budgetary cycle, and the 60-year PLAN 
anniversary all correlated to the 2009 surveillance confrontations, and although these 
factors cannot be firmly connected to the origins of any particular incident, they may 
have shaped the timing or hype of specific encounters for political purposes. 
2. Issue Elevation 
Shifting relational norms, initial diplomacy under the new Obama presidency, and 
an UNCLOS deadline correlated with early 2009 surveillance confrontations, supporting 
issue elevation as a second potential geopolitical driver that shaped these encounters. The 
emergence of the early March 2009 confrontations paralleled the convergence of many 
bilateral issues surrounding an important diplomatic exchange early into the Obama 
presidency, revealing their reappearance during a period of enhanced political efficiency. 
Unlike 2001, evidence in 2009 indicates maritime surveillance issues were integrated into 
important political discussions, supporting this driver’s applicability, both across early 
2009 and as a basis of specific early encounters. President Obama was inaugurated on 
January 20, 2009. The first major U.S. diplomatic initiative toward the PRC was 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit from February 20 to 22, 2009, which sought “to 
further develop a positive, cooperative relationship.”183 According to the People’s Daily, 
PRC President Hu Jintao acknowledged that the visit “reflects the importance the new 
U.S. administration puts on developing relations with China and other Asian 
182 “Chinese President Hu Urges Further Modernization of PLA Navy,” Window of China, Xinhua 
News Agency, April 25, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009–04/25/content_11252438.htm. 
183 Secretary Clinton: Travel to Asia, U.S. Department of State, accessed January 30, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/trvl/2009/116166.htm.  
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 countries.”184 On February 21, during Secretary Clinton’s visit to the PRC, a joint press 
conference was held in which Foreign Minister Yang stated: “The upcoming meeting 
between President Hu Jintao and President Barack Obama during the G-20 London 
financial summit in early April will be of great significance. The two sides will make 
careful preparations for the meeting, and ensure its success.”185 Secretary Clinton also 
stated: “I have invited the foreign minister to visit Washington during the week of March 
9th, to work with us as both our countries prepare for the April G-20 summit in 
London.”186 On March 7, the PRC confirmed Foreign Minister Yang’s U.S. visit from 
March 9 to 13, which sought to “exchange views on the growth of Sino-U.S. relations in 
the new phase and regional and global issues of common concern.”187 The visit’s 
confirmation correlated to escalating harassment upon Victorious and Impeccable from 
March 4 to 8, indicating a parallel development of the surveillance confrontations and 
this important diplomatic exchange. According to the South China Morning Post, 
Minister Yang’s March 12 meeting with President Obama “tried to focus on tackling a 
deepening economic crisis and defuse tensions over a confrontation at sea and Tibet,”188 
suggesting an interrelation of surveillance and harassment tensions and broader policy 
discussions, which supports issue elevation as a driver of these confrontations. EEZ 
surveillance operations had been a standing dispute between the U.S. and PRC, 
particularly since the late 1990s, but the continuous challenge of these activities would 
likely have been detrimental to bilateral relations; therefore, it is most likely that U.S. 
surveillance operations were once again contested during a period of enhanced political 
efficiency in early 2009. The infusion of surveillance issues into specific negotiations 
directly after the initial 2009 surveillance confrontations likely reflects a calculation of 
184“Chinese President Meets U.S. Secretary of State,” People’s Daily, February 22, 2009, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6598048.html. 
185 Secretary Clinton’s Press Conference with the Chinese FM,” Real Clear Politics, February 21, 
2009, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/02/secretary_clintons_press_confe.html. 
186 Ibid. 
187 “Chinese FM to Visit the United States,” China Internet Information Center (CIIS), last modified 
March 7, 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009–03/07/content_17397222.htm. 
188 “U.S. Talks Focus on Economic Crisis and Defusing Tensions,” South China Morning Post 
Online, March 13, 2009, Open Source Center (CPP20090313715005). 
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 this efficiency, supporting issue elevation as a driver of the PRC’s behavior during the 
March 4, 5, 7, and 8 encounters. 
Evidence supporting issue elevation also appears across the broader period of 
confrontations in 2009, supporting this driver as a source of the PRC’s behavior. A 
second likely display of issue elevation is indicated during Presidents Obama and Hu’s 
first meeting at the G-20 on April 2. During a press conference following this exchange, 
PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang was asked: “Did President Hu Jintao or 
President Obama discuss the confrontation between the Chinese and U.S. vessels on the 
South China Sea? Have they reached any consensus on how to prevent similar 
incidents?”189 Minister Qin replied: “As far as I know, they touched upon relevant issues 
whereas China has expounded on its position.”190 A final likely display of issue elevation 
occurred when Admiral Gary Roughead, CNO, visited the PRC for the PLAN’s 60-year 
anniversary on April 18; he spoke with the PLAN Commander, Vice Admiral Wu 
Shengli, discussing the recent maritime incidents, cooperative ventures, future MMCA 
meetings, and the military-to-military relationship.191 These discussions display a third 
injection of maritime surveillance and sovereignty issues into bilateral discussions, 
supporting issue elevation as a driver of the PRC’s behavior across this period. Vice 
Minister Yang’s March 11 and 12 meetings shaped the first meeting between Presidents 
Obama and Hu on April 2, and became the venue for converging PRC-U.S. political 
pressures, to include issues of maritime surveillance and sovereignty; this dynamic 
persisted across three significant meetings, supporting issue elevation as a driver of the 
PRC’s behavior during this broader period of enhanced political efficiency. 
An UNCLOS intricacy also correlated to the 2009 confrontations, which placed 
EEZ claims at a critical juncture, supporting international issue elevation as a geopolitical 
driver across this same period. Although UNCLOS claims may have been influential 
189 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on April 2, 2009, Permanent 
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN, April 3, 2009, http://www.china-
un.org/eng/fyrth/t555860.htm. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Admiral Gary Roughead Press Conference, United States Ambassador to China, April 21, 2009, 
http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/042109p.html. 
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 upon the confrontations, the U.S. was not a South China Sea territorial claimant, and 
there is no direct linkage between the UNCLOS process and the U.S. surveillance 
activities. These factors suggest that this issue may have reinforced the PRC’s behavior 
underlying the broad period of encounters, but it was not likely a primary driver of 
specific incidents. UNCLOS Article 4, Annex II states: “Where a coastal State intends to 
establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with 
supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 
10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.”192 The UN states: “the 
date of commencement of the 10-year time period for making submissions to the 
Commission is 13 May 1999.”193 Leading up to the May 13, 2009 deadline, UNCLOS 
signatories bordering the South China Sea submitted several EEZ claims. On February 
17, 2009, the Philippines House of Representatives and Senate amended Republic Act 
No. 3046, “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines,” 
affirming its claims, particularly toward the Scarborough Shoal and the Kalayaan 
(Spratly) Islands.194 On February 18, PRC Vice Minster Wang lodged a protest with the 
Philippine Embassy, stating “Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal] and Nansha Islands 
[the Spratly Islands] have always been inalienable parts of the Chinese 
territory…Territorial sovereignty claims…by any other country were illegal and 
invalid.”195 President Macapagal-Arroyo approved The Philippines’ act on March 10, 
2009.196 On April 8, the PRC lodged a protest with the UN against the Philippine’s 
192Annex II. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, United Nations Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, accessed February 25, 2014, 
https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/documents/annex2.htm.  
193 Issues with Respect to Article 4 of Annex II to the Convention (Ten Year Time Limit For 
Submissions), United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, accessed February 12, 
2014, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/issues_ten_years.htm.  
194 R.A. 9522, The LawPhil Project, accessed May 19, 2014, 
http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html.The LawPhil Project is sponsored by 
the Arellano Law Foundation, which publishes Philippine laws and legal information to the Internet.. 
195 “China Lodges Stern Protest over Baselines Bill of the Philippines,” Consulate-General of the 
People’s Republic of China in San Francisco, February 19, 2009, 
http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t538242.htm. 
196 R.A. 9522. 
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 pending claim, which was submitted April 21.197 Malaysia and Vietnam also submitted a 
joint claim on May 6, to which the PRC replied on May 7, stating that China “has 
indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters 
as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.”198 UNCLOS claims persisted in parallel to the 
2009 surveillance confrontations, which lasted until May 1, supporting the international 
elevation of maritime sovereignty as an issue that shaped the PRC’s confrontational 
behavior in early 2009. Although the U.S. in not a South China Sea claimant, and there 
are no indications that the confrontations directly influenced this dynamic, it likely 
reinforced the PRC’s confrontational behavior across this period. Parallels between the 
2009 surveillance confrontations and shifting relational norms, important diplomatic 
exchanges under the new Obama presidency, and an UNCLOS deadline all support issue 
elevation as a driver of the PRC’s behavior during specific initial encounters and across 
the broader early 2009 period of enhanced political efficiency. 
3. Political Reaction 
Adverse PRC responses to U.S. human rights initiatives correlated to the early 
March 2009 surveillance confrontations, supporting a political reaction as a third 
potential geopolitical driver that influenced these encounters. This instigator may have 
shaped the timing or hype of specific incidents to signal dissatisfaction or shift focus 
away from this issue by redirecting political and media attention. However, specific 
incidents cannot be firmly tied to this factor, and the later confrontations appear 
unrelated, revealing the limitations of this assertion. On February 21, during Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Beijing, she stressed the ascendency of PRC-U.S. 
cooperation over other objectives, including human rights initiatives, stating: “Successive 
administrations and Chinese governments have been poised back and forth on these 
issues, and we have to continue to press them. But our pressing on those issues can’t 
197 Philippines, The United Nations Division For Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, last modified 
September 26, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/PHL.htm.  
198 Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, last modified May 3, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm. 
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 interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the 
security crisis.”199 Jeffrey Bader, the National Security Council Director for East Asian 
Affairs, recalled a U.S. domestic backlash from Secretary Clinton’s statements: 
“Editorials and NGO comments purported to detect either a Clinton or Obama doctrine in 
these short remarks, suggesting they signified that Secretary Clinton and the Obama 
administration were indifferent to human rights and were prepared to sacrifice human 
rights progress for global cooperation.”200 On February 25, amidst this fallout, the U.S. 
State Department released its annual report on PRC human rights, stating: “The [PRC] 
government’s human rights record remained poor and worsened in some areas.”201 PRC 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma replied on March 2, two days before the Victorious 
incident, stating: “We resolutely oppose any country in any way interfering in China’s 
internal affairs under the pretext of human rights. We urge the U.S. side to reflect on its 
own human rights problems, stop acting as a ‘human rights guardian’ and stop interfering 
in other’s internal affairs by releasing human rights reports.”202 These events display 
growing U.S. human rights pressures that coincided with the 2009 confrontations, 
supporting a political reaction as a geopolitical driver that may have influenced the early 
March encounters. 
March 10, 2009 marked the Tibetan uprising’s 50-year anniversary, which 
became a focus of emerging U.S. human rights pressures, further correlating this dynamic 
to the surveillance confrontations. The PRC foresaw the potential for impending tensions, 
inferred from its March 2 preemptive publishing of the “White Paper: 50 Years of 
199 “Clinton: Chinese Human Rights Can’t Interfere With Other Crisis,” CNN, February 22, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/21/clinton.china.asia/. 
200 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 15–16. 
201 2008 Human Rights Report: China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), U.S. Department of 
State, February 25, 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm. 
202 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu’s Remarks on U.S. State Department Releasing 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
UN, March 2, 2009, http://www.china-un.org/eng/fyrth/t539879.htm. 
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 Democratic Reform in Tibet,” defending its actions in the province.203 Harassment upon 
Victorious commenced two days later on March 4, and plateaued on March 8 toward 
Impeccable. On the March 10 Tibetan anniversary, the Dalai Lama stated that PRC rule 
has “thrust Tibetans into such depths of suffering and hardship that they literally 
experienced hell on earth.”204 On March 11, H.Con.Res 226 was passed, calling for “the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China to respond to the Dalai Lama’s initiatives 
to find a lasting solution to the Tibetan issue, cease its repression of the Tibetan people, 
and to lift immediately the harsh policies imposed on Tibetans.”205 This resolution 
passed the same day as Secretary Clinton’s March 11 meeting with Foreign Minister 
Yang, and the day before President Obama’s meeting with him, which also included 
discussions involving Tibet and the surveillance confrontations.206 PRC-U.S. human 
rights dynamics reveal that the new Obama Administration initially emphasized bilateral 
cooperation amidst the financial crisis over PRC human rights reforms. However, a 
domestic backlash created concentrated pressures in early March, which correlated to the 
surveillance confrontations. Evidence supports a political reaction as a driver that may 
have shaped the initial 2009 encounters to signal dissatisfaction or shift focus away from 
this issue by redirecting political and media attention. However, this driver cannot be 
firmly linked to any specific incident, and the continuation of harassment through early 
2009 PRC-U.S. human rights tensions suggests that this was not likely the primary 
instigator of these encounters, exposing the limitations of this assertion. 
4. Political Linkage 
Taiwan arms sales tensions correlated to the 2009 surveillance confrontations, 
supporting a political linkage as a fourth potential geopolitical driver that shaped the 
PRC’s behavior. Although there is a correlation between the resurfacing of Taiwan 
203 White Paper: 50 Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet, Permanent Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the UN, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.china-un.org/eng/gdxw/t539939.htm. 
204 Robert Mackey, “The Dalai Lama’s ‘Hell on Earth’ Speech,” The New York Times, March 10, 
2009, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/the-dalai-lamas-hell-on-earth-speech/. 
205 House Resolution on Tibet (H.R. 226), Council on Foreign Relations, March 11, 2009, 
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/house-resolution-tibet-hr-226/p18759. 
206 “U.S. Talks Focus.” 
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 tensions and the initial confrontations, there are several limitations to this assertion. Their 
perpetuation past the diplomatic exchanges relevant to Art’s “fungibility of force,” and a 
lack of evidence linking Taiwan arms sales dynamics to any particular encounter or its 
political leveraging, suggests that this factor was not a primary driver, but limited to 
shaping the encounters or their ensuing discussions.207 Kan states that on October 3, 
2008, President Bush notified Congress that Taiwan arms sales would proceed; 
consequently, “the PLA suspended some military meetings and port visits, in a 
“continued politicization” of contacts...The PRC also suspended bilateral talks to 
cooperate on weapons non-proliferation.”208 On February 27, 2009, shortly into the 
Obama presidency, PRC-U.S. military talks resumed; however, Taiwan arms sales 
remained precarious, as indicated by the PRC’s co-chair of the talks, Qian Lihua’s 
statements: “China-U.S. military relations remain in a difficult period. We expect the 
U.S. side to take concrete measures for the resumption and development of our military 
ties.”209 Qian also stated: “The difficulties in the two countries’ military relations have 
been caused by the U.S. side. The Taiwan issue involves China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, involves the feeling of the 1.3 billion Chinese people, and is the core 
interest and concern of the Chinese side. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan not only damage the 
Chinese side’s core security interests, but also affect the peace and stability of the Taiwan 
Strait’s situation.”210 On March 12, the same day as his meeting with President Obama, 
Foreign Minister Yang stated: “We will never waiver in our commitment to the one 
China principle and will never compromise our opposition to ‘Taiwan independence,’ 
‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’… We hope that the U.S. side will honor its 
commitments, prudently and properly handle Taiwan-related issues, and take concrete 
207 Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” 19. 
208 Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms,” 44. 
209 Dan Martin, “China Warns U.S. on Taiwan as Military Talks Resume,” AFP, February 27, 2009, 
Open Source Center (CPP20090227968139). This article was published in Hong Kong through AFP, an 
independent French press agency. 
210 Xiong Zhengyan, “China-U.S. Military Relations Develop Amid Twists and Turns” Xinhua Asia-
Pacific Service, March 1, 2009, Open Source Center, (CPP20090301138003). Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service 
is China’s official news service for the Asia-Pacific region. 
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 actions to support the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.”211 This statement 
indicates a basis of correlative tension; however, there are no indications of political 
leveraging between these issues. The 2009 surveillance confrontations correlated to PRC-
U.S. adversities over Taiwan, which resurfaced following resumed PRC-U.S. military 
talks in late February 2009. This factor may have influenced the encounters or their 
ensuing discussions during the PRC’s initial pattern of surveillance confrontations by 
shaping issues across domains. However, even though this driver correlates to the early 
March confrontations, it cannot be firmly linked to any encounter, there is a lack of 
evidence that political linkage occurred, and it was not likely relevant during the later 
incidents, exposing the limitations of this assertion. 
C. A DETERRENT TO ADVERSITY: THE GREAT RECESSION (2009) 
In contrast to several drivers of PRC-U.S. tensions, economic uncertainties 
surrounding the Great Recession were also present in early 2001, requiring cooperative 
PRC-U.S. efforts that support its deterrence of broader adversity. The 2009 surveillance 
confrontations occurred in this context, which likely mitigated adversities related to these 
encounters. Marc Labonte describes the Great Recession, which began in 2007, 
“deepened from the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, …[and]… features 
the largest decline in output, consumption, and investment, and the largest increase in 
unemployment, of any post-war recession.”212 In response to this growing crisis, the first 
G-20 meeting was held in Washington, DC, on November 14 and 15, 2008, to 
“strengthening financial regulation, with agreement on a 47-point action plan to arrest 
deteriorating financial market conditions and improve financial regulation over the 
medium term.”213 Bader states the new Obama administration’s highest foreign policy 
211 “Chinese FM Warns U.S. on Taiwan,” The China Post Online, March 14, 2009, Open Source 
Center (CPP20090314968095) The China Post Online is an Internet newspaper in English, published in 
Taipei, Taiwan, which expresses pan-blue party viewpoints. 
212 Marc Labonte, “The 2007–2009 Recession: Similarities to and Differences from the Past,” 
Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2001), summary, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40198.pdf.  
213 2008 Washington, The Group of 20, accessed February 7, 2014, 
https://www.g20.org/about_g20/past_summits/2008_washington.  
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 objective was “to spur global economic recovery from the financial meltdown and deep 
global recession.”214 Prior to the second G-20 meeting in London on April 2, 2009, the 
NPC convened from March 5 to 13, focusing upon “unison actions to combat downturn 
amid the global financial crisis,”215 also revealing the primacy of this issue for the PRC. 
Additionally, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Dow) hit a 12-year low on March 9, 
2009, which was a point many considered to be the bottom of the Great Recession, 
exposing its heightened capacity to compel PRC-U.S. economic policy coordination.216 
Pressures for PRC-U.S. economic cooperation in the wake of the Great Recession 
correlated with the 2009 surveillance confrontations, supporting its deterrence of broader 
adversity. 
Foreign Minister Yang’s March meetings were also influenced by a drive toward 
economic cooperation. According to the China Daily, Foreign Minister Yang’s early 
March visit to the U.S. was “to prepare the meeting between the heads of the two states 
and compare notes with U.S. officials on the proposals to be raised at the upcoming G20 
meetings.”217 Following Foreign Minister Yang’s agenda-setting meetings on March 11 
and 12, he stated that the April 2 meeting would “chart the course for the further 
development of China-U.S. relations, …[and that]…we can hardly find an area where 
China-U.S. cooperation is not needed.”218 The second meeting of the G-20 convened in 
London on April 2, 2009, to coordinate “fiscal and monetary stimulus measures to avert 
the threat of global depression.”219 Presidents Obama and Hu met for the first time just 
prior to this meeting, agreeing to “intensify coordination and cooperation on global and 
214 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 21. 
215 “China’s Top Legislature Ends.” 
216 “Tracking the Dow One Year After Rock Bottom,” ABC News, March 9, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/year-ago-today-dow-hit-bottom-recession/story?id=10046578. 
217 “China Offers U.S. Help To Tackle Financial Crisis,” China Daily, March 14, 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009–03/14/content_7578955.htm. 
218 Ibid. 
219 2009 London, Group of 20, accessed February 7, 2014, 
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 economic and financial issues.”220 On April 3, Foreign Minister Yang stated that the 
presidents: 
Agreed to make joint efforts to build positive, cooperative, and 
comprehensive China-U.S. relations in the 21st century; to establish a 
China-U.S. strategic and economic dialogue mechanism; and to reach a 
consensus on further deepening mutually beneficial cooperation in a wide 
range of spheres. Obama accepted President Hu Jintao’s invitation and 
will visit China in the second half of the year. This meeting opened up a 
new era for the healthy and stable development of China-U.S. relations.221 
This statement highlights the April 2 bilateral meeting’s important on the spirit of PRC-
U.S. relations under the Obama presidency. This meeting was coordinated during Foreign 
Minister Yang’s early March visit, which correlated to the surveillance confrontations. In 
light of these dynamics, the 2009 confrontations remained below the threshold to 
undermine an overall cooperative tone in PRC-U.S. relations, supporting the Great 
Recession’s deterrence of broader adversity across this period. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations, the specifics of each incident, 
and several geopolitical factors, all defined the 2009 surveillance confrontations. 
Domestic pressures, issue elevation, political reaction, and political linkage were four 
potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior, while the Great Recession likely deterred 
broader adversity. Table 3 highlights several significant events in PRC-U.S. relations 
surrounding the 2009 confrontations. The development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations, 
all five confrontations, and the 2001 and 2009 geopolitical dimensions are contrasted in 
the following chapter to assess the PRC’s potential behavioral drivers across these 
factors. 
  
220 “Key Sino-U.S. Dialogue Set for Summer,” China Daily, April 2, 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/g20/2009–04/02/content_7640544.htm. 
221 “Firm Up Confidence, Strengthen Cooperation, Promote Reform, and Jointly Overcome Current 
Difficulties,” Xinhua Domestic Service, April 3, 2009, Open Source Center, (CPP20090403354001). 
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 Table 3.   Chronology of Early 2009 PRC-U.S. Relations.222 
Date: Event Description: 
Nov 15–20, 2008 First G-20 meeting held in response to global financial crisis. 
Jan 20, 2009 President Obama Inaugurated. 
Feb 17 Philippines House and Senate pass maritime claims resolution. 
Feb 20–22 Secretary of State Clinton visits PRC, Feb. 21 speech creates domestic backlash.  
Feb 25 U.S. State Department publishes adverse PRC human rights report. 
Feb 27 PRC-U.S. military talks resume. 
Mar 2 PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma contests U.S. report on PRC human rights. 
Mar 2 PRC publishes the White Paper: 50 Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet. 
Mar 4 PRC announces 14.9% military budget increase. 
Mar 4 USNS Victorious harassment commences. 
Mar 5–13 Annual NPC meeting. 
Mar 5 USNS Impeccable harassment commences. 
Mar 7 PRC announces Foreign Minister Yang’s visit to the U.S. 
Mar 8 USNS Impeccable harassment plateaus. 
Mar 9–13 Minster Yang visits U.S., meets Sec. Clinton Mar 11 and Pres. Obama Mar 12. 
Mar 9 Dow hits 12-year low marking height of Great Recession. 
Mar 10 Philippine Baseline Law Approved by President Macapagal-Arroyo. 
Mar 10 50th Anniversary of Tibetan uprising and Dali Lama comments. 
Mar 11 H.Con.Res 226 passed supporting Tibetan plight. 
Apr 2 G-20 meeting. President Obama and Hu’s first meeting, confrontations 
di d   Apr 8 PRC lodges protest with UN against the Philippines’ pending claim. 
Apr 21 UNCLOS claim submitted by the Philippines. 
Apr 23 PLAN 60-year anniversary. Admiral Roughead, CNO visits PRC. 
May 1 Final PLAN harassment against USNS Victorious. 
May 6 Malaysia and Vietnam submit Joint UNCLOS claim, PRC responds on May 7.. 
May 13 UNCLOS EEZ claims deadline. 
222  2008 Washington; R.A. 9522; Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 15–16; 2008 Human Rights 
Report: China; Martin, “China Warns U.S.”; Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma; White Paper: 50 Years;  
“China to Boost Military”; McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1–2; “China’s Top Legislature Ends”; Pedrozo, 
“Close Encounters,” 101; “Chinese FM to Visit”; “U.S. Talks Focus”; “Tracking the Dow”; Mackey, “The 
Dali Lama’s”; House Resolution on Tibet; Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin; Philippines; Admiral Gary 
Roughead; “Pentagon Wars over Chinese”; Joint Submission By Malaysia; Issues with Respect. 
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 VIII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SURVEILLANCE 
CONFRONTATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Surveillance confrontations on the PRC’s maritime periphery were defined by the 
development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations, the specific circumstances of each incident, 
and several geopolitical factors. Potential drivers of the PRC’s behavior are explored 
across these elements, suggesting that operational opportunism, domestic pressures, issue 
elevation, political reaction, and political linkage each draw on a range of supporting and 
conflicting evidence as instigators of the PRC’s behavior. However, based upon this 
assessment, the surveillance confrontations were most likely driven by issue elevation 
and operational opportunism in early 2001 and 2009, while the 2002 incident was most 
likely limited to operational opportunism. The PRC’s maritime forces were most likely 
given the charge to opportunistically challenge U.S. maritime surveillance operations 
across early 2001 and 2009, in an effort to politically elevate maritime sovereignty and 
surveillance issues during periods of enhanced political efficiency.  
Drivers of the PRC’s behavior from domestic pressures, political reactions, and 
political linkages were also present surrounding the 2001 and 2009 confrontations; 
however, they cannot be linked to the encounters with any degree of certainty. 
Additionally, both periods also contained a strong PRC-U.S. deterrent to adversity, 
namely, the PRC’s WTO accession in 2001 and the Great Recession in 2009, which 
likely mitigated the adversities of their respective surveillance confrontations. These 
findings indicate that future vulnerability periods may appear, in which there is an 
increased probability of this dynamic resurfacing when U.S. surveillance norms are most 
susceptible to political challenge. Contrasting the drivers of the PRC’s behavior across all 
five encounters supports this assessment. 
B. COMPARATIVE DRIVER ANALYSIS 
The five plausible drivers of surveillance confrontations assessed include: 
operational opportunism, domestic pressures, issue elevation, political reaction, and 
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 political linkage. Supporting and conflicting evidence for each driver is presented to 
weigh its viability as a primary instigator of the PRC’s behavior. 
1. Operational Opportunism 
The first potential explanation for the surveillance confrontations is that they 
resulted from local commanders’ opportunistic initiatives. This view contains varying 
degrees of support across all five incidents. The early 2001 confrontations followed a 
recent PRC bolstering of its EEZ sovereignty claims in the late 1990s, the creation of the 
CMS in 1998, and an increase in U.S. surveillance flights in the second half of 2000.223 
From this standpoint, the PRC’s harassment of U.S. airborne surveillance assets from 
December 2000 until the EP-3 collision on April 1, 2001 appears to be a consequence of 
tensions from these intersecting dynamics, which resulted in greater numbers of PRC and 
U.S. units coming into contact within an increasingly contested domain. Additionally, 
PRC sources claimed that at the time of the 2001 Bowditch incident, the vessel was 
observing a PLA submarine exercise, indicating a specific operational objective 
underlying this case of harassment.224 Interestingly, the September 19, 2002 Bowditch 
incident occurred one month after Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s visit to 
the PRC in August, which largely focused on “making preparations for the meeting 
between Presidents Bush and Jiang in Crawford scheduled for October 25 [2002];”225 
however, there is a lack of public evidence that this encounter generated any political 
discussions or that it was significantly related to any other potential drivers. Therefore, it 
appears to have been a random occurrence that was divorced from overarching political 
objectives, also supporting an operational basis underlying the PRC’s behavior. The 2009 
Victorious and Impeccable incidents began nearly simultaneously, but continued 
sporadically over several weeks, supporting operational opportunism as a driver across a 
period in which local commanders likely challenged U.S. surveillance assets as the 
223 “Provisions on the Administration”; “Law of the People’s”; Cole, The Great Wall, 81; Ricks, 
“Anger over Flights.” 
224 Ren, “U.S. Military Planes.” 
225 Richard L. Armitage, Press Conference, U.S. Department of State, August 26, 2002, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/2002/13180.htm. 
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 opportunity appeared.226 These trends bolster operational opportunism as a contributing 
element across all surveillance confrontations. 
Looking at the surveillance confrontations more broadly, conflicting evidence 
emerges, requiring consideration of additional drivers of the PRC’s behavior. First, a lack 
of high profile harassment following the 2002 Bowditch incident through the remainder 
of the Bush Presidency reveals a large gap in these activities. This period likely contained 
many other similar harassment opportunities, exemplified by a PRC Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs official’s September 2006 concerns regarding the activities of four U.S. 
surveillance vessels, which were not accompanied by similar PRC behavior.227 
Additional evidence supporting political motives for the PRC’s behavior is found in the 
characteristics of the 2001 and 2009 incidents. 
The disposition of the PRC assets involved, particularly during the 2009 
incidents, suggests coordinated encounters. While the 2001 confrontations were executed 
solely by PLAN assets, the 2002 and 2009 incidents integrated fishery and oceanographic 
vessels.”228 Goldstein states that China’s Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) 
falls under the Ministry of Agriculture and the CMS falls under the State Oceanographic 
Administration (SOA), which reports directly to the State Council.229 Cole states that the 
CMS is “the most military coast guard organization…is responsible for coordination with 
the PLAN…[and]…is closely associated with the PLAN.”230 Cole also relays that the 
vessels involved in the incidents “likely were CMS vessels operating under PLAN 
direction.”231 Goldstein outlines the purpose of using coast guard vessels for harassment 
activities: “A Chinese military analyst wrote in June 2008 that coast guard involvement 
226 McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1–2. 
227 Yu, “Jurisprudential Analysis,” 41. 
228 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters, 101; Xu, “Chinese Fishing Boat”; “RAW Data: Pentagon”; Starr, 
“Chinese Boats Harassed.” 
229 Lyle Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenges and Opportunities in China’s 
Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2010), 15, 18, 20. 
http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-
Institute/Publications/documents/CMSI_No5_web1.pdf. 
230 Cole, The Great Wall, 81. 
231 Ibid. 
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 would not complicate crises in the same way that direct navy involvement might.”232 
This reasoning supports the greater inclusion of CMS assets in these confrontations, 
beginning with the 2002 Bowditch incident, which was the first encounter following the 
political consequences of the EP-3 collision.233 The varied dispositions of the PRC’s 
assets indicate bureaucratic coordination amongst multiple agencies, demanding 
consideration of drivers originating higher in the PRC’s governmental hierarchy. 
The geographic and temporal similarities of the 2001 and 2009 confrontations 
also demand assessment of additional instigators of the PRC’s behavior. The 2001 
incidents occurred one week apart, with the USNS Bowditch harassment transpiring in 
the East China Sea on March 23, and the EP-3 and F-8 accidentally colliding over South 
China Sea on April 1.234 Similarly, the 2009 incidents began one day apart, with 
harassment commencing upon USNS Victorious in the East China Sea, and USNS 
Impeccable in the South China Sea, on March 4 and 5, 2009, respectively.235 Figure 7 
displays this correlation, which took place across the PLAN’s fleet and the CMS’s 
regional boundaries, supporting synchronization. 
232 Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring, 32. 
233 Xu, “Chinese fishing Boat.” 
234 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 1. 
235 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1–2. 
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Figure 7.  Map of 2001 and 2009 Surveillance Confrontations.236 
Based upon the PLAN’s structure, coordination was likely initiated from at least 
the Headquarters Department in Beijing, if not higher in the PRC’s governmental 
hierarchy. Cole indicates that operational command of the PLAN passes through the 
Headquarters Department, which contains an Operations Office that “oversees the three 
operational fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet.”237 
Cole also highlights that the CMS has “regional headquarters in Qingdao (covering the 
Bo and Yellow seas), Shanghai (covering the East China Sea), and Guangzhou, (covering 
the South China Sea).”238 The 2001 incidents occurred one week apart, with the EP-3 
accident transpiring after several months of hazardous intercepts, weakening this logic in 
this case.239 However, since the dangerous airborne intercepts persisted for months after 
a U.S. diplomatic protest in December 2000, this suggests there was at least implicit 
approval for these continued activities from central PRC authorities, both before and after 
the Bowditch incident on March 23.240 The 2009 incidents commenced one day apart 
236 The author created this map from a similar map in Redden, “Managing Sino-U.S.,” 6. 
237 Cole, The Great Wall, 70. 
238 Ibid., 81. 
239 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 1. 
240 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 1. 
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 across fleet and CMS regional boundaries, also suggesting coordination and planning 
from Beijing.241 The large gap in surveillance confrontations from 2002 to 2009, coupled 
with its sudden, apparently coordinated reemergence, warrants investigation of additional 
top-down drivers of the PRC’s behavior. 
2. Domestic Pressure 
A second potential explanation for surveillance confrontations was that they 
resulted from domestic political pressures, which instigated tensions to promote the 
defense of maritime sovereignty for increased PLAN budgets and modernization 
resources. In 2001 and 2009, the surveillance confrontations correlated to the yearly NPC 
sessions and PLA budget announcements. In 2001, the PRC announced an 18% defense 
budget increase at the NPC on March 6, the same day as the first of two consecutive 
airborne incidents.242 In 2009, the PRC announced a 14.9% defense budget increase on 
March 4, the same day harassment commenced upon Victorious and the day before the 
start of the NPC session and the Impeccable incident.243 These examples align with 
Shambaugh’s assertion regarding the PRC’s defense budget: “the total figure announced 
is both the outcome of a year-long bidding and negotiating process and the catalyst for 
the next budget cycle.”244 This dynamic may indicate that March is a month in which the 
enhancement of threats to the PRC’s security and sovereignty could not only be used to 
justify the recently published budget, but also provide a degree of political clout for the 
next annual “bidding and negotiating process.”245 The PLAN’s 60-year anniversary was 
a second domestic driver present towards the end of the 2009 incidents that further 
supports this assertion.246 These trends suggest domestic pressures may have been an 
element of the March of 2001 and 2009 confrontations. 
241 Ricks, “Anger over Flights.” 
242 “The Uneasy Triangle.” Ren, “U.S. Military Planes.” 
243 “China to Boost.” Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1-2; Guo, “NPC 
Session Fruitful.” 
244 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 205. 
245 Ibid. 
246 “Chinese President Hu.” 
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 Although evidence indicates the presence of domestic instigators in March of 
2001 and 2009, this explanation lacks the continuity and substance to be the primary 
driver of the PRC’s behavior. First, several NPC’s and substantial PRC defense budget 
increases have transpired in the month of March before, between, and following 2001 and 
2009, without accompanying surveillance confrontations. Second, the hazardous airborne 
intercepts started in December 2000 and peaked weeks after the March NPC, indicating a 
misalignment of this dynamic. The September 2002 Bowditch incident is also completely 
out of phase with its annual PRC defense budget cycle. Finally, the early 2009 
confrontations fit this dynamic, but their perpetuation through both the March NPC and 
the 60-year PLAN anniversary in April is also problematic for this claim.247 Conflicting 
evidence suggests that domestic pressures were not the primary driver the PRC’s 
behavior, but this element may have been integrated into the timings or hype surrounding 
specific 2001 and 2009 incidents. 
3. Issue Elevation 
A third potential explanation for the surveillance confrontations was that they 
were strategically timed to elevate maritime sovereignty and surveillance issues to 
politically challenge this norm during the early 2001 and 2009 presidencies, or leading up 
to a 2009 UNCLOS claims deadline. The first view is the most substantiated geopolitical 
explanation of this study, in which U.S. surveillance operations were challenged during 
specific periods, when surveillance confrontations possess enhanced political efficiency. 
According to a 2001 Washington Post article, the U.S. increased its reconnaissance 
flights in the second half of 2000, to which the PRC responded with additional intercepts; 
however, starting in December 2000, these intercepts became hazardous.248 The 
intensification of dangerous intercepts in December 2000 was on top of an established 
pattern of airborne encounters that stemmed from a convergence of PRC-U.S. pressures 
and disagreements in the maritime domain. This acceleration coincided with President 
Bush’s confirmed victory in December; confrontations further accelerated during the first 
247 “China To Boost”; “Chinese President Hu.” 
248 Ricks, “Anger over Flights.” 
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 surface encounter involving USNS Bowditch and through continued hazardous intercepts 
into early April 2001, displaying parallel tensions between surveillance confrontations 
and broader PRC-U.S. political pressures.249 These parallel pressures in March 2001 are 
exemplified by the previous assessment of PRC-U.S. human rights and Taiwan arms 
sales tensions during this period. This pattern suggests that this issue followed suit with 
other bilateral political dynamics, supporting broad issue elevation across the early Bush 
Presidency as an instigator of the PRC’s behavior. 
In 2009, the March 4, 5, 7, and 8 Victorious and Impeccable incidents occurred 
just days prior to Foreign Minister Yang’s previously arranged meetings with top U.S. 
leaders, which sought to “to prepare the meeting between the heads of the two states and 
compare notes with U.S. officials on the proposals to be raised at the upcoming G20 
meetings,”250 and to “exchange views on the growth of Sino-U.S. relations in the new 
phase and regional and global issues of common concern.”251 PRC media sources 
indicated that the March 12 meeting between President Obama and Foreign Minister 
Yang “tried to focus on tackling a deepening economic crisis and defuse tensions over a 
confrontation at sea and Tibet,”252 demonstrating the elevation of EEZ surveillance 
issues into discussions containing primary bilateral concerns. Issues related to the 
confrontations were also discussed during President Obama and Hu’s first meeting on 
April 2 and Admiral Roughead’s late April visit to the PRC, displaying political 
vulnerabilities that mirrored surveillance confrontations across this several week 
period.253 This evidence suggests that the 2001 and 2009 confrontations resulted from 
issue elevation, in which the advancement of maritime surveillance and sovereignty 
disputes echoed broader political adversities across two periods, in which challenges to 
this norm possessed enhanced political efficiency. Under this claim, the 2001 
acceleration of airborne confrontations was transcribed onto a previous pattern of less 
249 Ibid.; Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101. 
250 “China Offers U.S. Help. 
251 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1–2; “Chinese FM to Visit.” 
252 “U.S. Talks Focus.” 
253 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin; Admiral Gary Roughead”; “Pentagon Warns Over Chinese..” 
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 contentious airborne intercepts, while the 2009 confrontational pattern commenced at an 
ideal time to elevate this issue into Foreign Minister Yang’s early March meetings at the 
start of a period of political vulnerability. 
Although evidence suggests issue elevation was likely a primary driver of the 
PRC’s behavior, several aspects discredit the notion that every encounter was specifically 
designed to interject this issue into particular meetings, with the exception of the initial 
2009 confrontations. First, the 2001 and 2009 incidents perpetuated past the high-level 
negotiation towards which they would have had the most impact. The March 23, 2001 
Bowditch incident occurred on the last day of Vice Premier Qian’s meetings, during 
which there is no public record of this issue’s discussion.254 Hazardous PLAN airborne 
intercepts also continued after Vice Premier Qian’s visit in 2001, indicating it was not 
specifically aimed at this juncture.255 Second, the September 2002 Bowditch incident was 
likely an isolated encounter, lacking any accompanying records of subsequent 
diplomacy.256 Lastly, while the initial early 2009 maritime incidents were well-timed, the 
later encounters continued until May 1, which was after the conclusion of Foreign 
Minister Yang’s meetings, President Obama and Hu’s first meeting at the G-20 on April 
2, and Admiral Roughead’s April visit to the PRC.257 These discrepancies do not 
undermine issue elevation as a primary driver of surveillance confrontations, but they 
suggest that the 2001 and 2009 incidents were likely executed as broad attempts to 
elevate maritime surveillance and sovereignty issues across two periods. In 2009, 
however, the start of this period appears strategically timed to align with a specific venue 
well suited for this purpose. 
A second, less-supportable assertion claims that the surveillance confrontations 
were a driven by the PRC’s desire to elevate its EEZ claims leading up to the 2009 
254 Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101; Yang, “Expanding Consensus.”  
255 Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision,” 1; Yang, “Expanding Consensus.” 
256 Kan, “U.S.-China Military,” 62. 
257 McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1–2; U.S. Talks Focus”; Key Sino-U.S. Dialogue”; Admiral Gary 
Roughead.” 
 79 
                                                 
 UNCLOS deadline.258 Although there were many parallels between these dynamics in 
early 2009, this issue was not likely a primary driver of the PRC’s behavior since the 
U.S. was not a South China Sea claimant nation and the confrontations do not appear to 
have had any direct impact on the concurrent UNCLOS dynamics. This suggests that the 
UNCLOS deadline was likely limited to reinforcing the PRC’s confrontational behavior 
across this broad period of encounters. 
4. Political Reaction 
A fourth potential explanation for the surveillance confrontations was that they 
were adverse reactions to unfavorable U.S. political initiatives, intended to signal 
dissatisfaction or shift political focus through the redirection of political and media 
attention. This driver was likely limited to shaping the timing or hype related to specific 
encounters and was not likely a primary driver of the broader confrontational patterns in 
2001 and 2009. In March 2001, several U.S. legislative actions towards PRC human 
rights conditions occurred just prior to the confrontations. Following a Senate human 
rights resolution on March 20, and a Congressional resolution to deny the Beijing 
Olympic bid on March 21, a PRC spokesman’s responded with negative statements on 
March 23, the same day as the Bowditch incident.259 Following the 2001 Bowditch 
incident, a UNCHR resolution was forwarded by the U.S. on March 26, just before the 
most hazardous airborne intercept to date that led to the accidental EP-3 and F-8 collision 
on April 1.260 In 2009, tensions from U.S. pressures for PRC human rights reforms grew 
following Secretary Clinton’s February 21 statements, further increased after the release 
of an adverse PRC human rights report on February 25, and strengthened towards an 
anticipated Tibetan anniversary on March 10.261 The March 2009 confrontations 
occurred just prior to a culmination of several pressures towards this focal point. These 
examples support surveillance confrontations as adverse PRC responses to these 
258 Issues with Respect. 
259 Glaser, “U.S.-China Relations”; H.Con.Res.73–107th Congress; “China FM Spokesman 
Condemns.” 
260 Lu, “Chronology of China-U.S.;” Kan, “China-U.S. Aircraft,” 1. 
261 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 15–16; 2008 Human Rights Report: China; White Paper: 50 
Years. 
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 initiatives, serving as a signal of dissatisfaction or a means of shifting focus away from 
this contentious issue through the redirection of political and media attention. 
Several aspects discredit a political reaction as the primary driver of the PRC’s 
behavior. While the timing of these incidents conveniently lines up with these two sets of 
human rights initiatives, other congressional resolutions, adverse human rights reports, 
and notable anniversaries did not generate similar responses. Likewise, the 2002 
Bowditch incident appears to be disconnected from any similar dynamics. Second, this 
driver cannot be firmly linked to the origins of any incidents during either period. Finally, 
a trend of hazardous airborne intercepts was established before the March 2001 
initiatives, while the 2009 confrontations continued for weeks after the early March 
human rights pressures, indicating several flaws discrediting a political reaction as the 
primary driver of the PRC’s behavior; therefore, this driver was likely limited to shaping 
the timing or hype related to specific encounters.262 
5. Political Linkage 
A fifth potential explanation for the surveillance confrontations was that they 
were initiatives to increase the PRC’s overall bargaining position towards separate issues 
through a political linkage strategy, applying the “fungibility of force” to shape issues 
across policy domains.263 This factor may have influenced the encounters or their 
aftermath within the broader 2001 and 2009 patters of surveillance confrontation, but it 
was not likely a primary driver of any specific incident. In early 2001, under a looming 
annual U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talk in April, Admiral Blair, commander of PACOM, 
visited the PRC to discuss this issue on March 14.264 Vice Premier Qian discussed the 
issue again during meetings with top U.S. leaders from March 21 to 23, which ended on 
the same day as the 2001 Bowditch incident.265 President Jiang made statements on 
March 25, indicating Taiwan tensions continued through these meetings and the March 
262 Ricks, “Anger over Flights”; McVadon, “The Reckless,” 1–2. 
263 Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” 19. 
264 Kan, “U.S.-China Military Contacts,” 53. 
265 Vice Premier Qian Qichen Holds. 
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 23 Bowditch incident, exposing a continued motive for creating additional fungible 
political pressure prior to the hazardous airborne intercept that led to the accidental EP-3 
collision.266 In 2009, Foreign Minister Yang met with top U.S. leaders on March 11 and 
12 to set the agenda for the first meeting between the presidents in April.267 Military talks 
had recently resumed just prior to this meeting, which were suspended by the PRC in late 
2008 due to Taiwan arms sales, raising this issue’s importance going into this important 
diplomatic juncture.268 Maritime surveillance and sovereignty were discussed alongside 
this issue, opening the possibility for intersecting dialogues, under which the “fungibility 
of force” may have crossed policy domains.269 These dynamics support political linkage 
as a driver that may have shaped the 2001 and 2009 confrontations. 
Several aspects discredit a political linkage strategy as the primary driver of the 
PRC’s behavior. The first weakness of this argument is that diplomatic exchanges and 
Taiwan tensions are a recurring process in PRC-U.S. relations, and this strategy has not 
appeared in conjunction with other meetings. A second flaw of this argument is that 
manufacturing tensions is a risky endeavor that can undermine cooperation on major 
issues, as was nearly the case following the EP-3 incident and the PRC’s WTO accession 
process.270 A third weakness of this argument is that there is no way to prove that this 
issue was leveraged upon other issues during diplomatic discussions, or even that the 
opposite consequence did not occur, in which the PRC’s harassment activities were the 
target of U.S. political leveraging. Finally, the December 2000 origins of hazardous 
airborne intercepts, the September 2002 Bowditch incident, and the May 2009 Victorious 
incident appear unlinked to any venues for applying political leverage, further 
diminishing the strength of this assertion.271 These flaws discredit a political linkage 
strategy as the primary driver of the PRC’s behavior; however, this factor may have 
266 Wu, “President Jiang Zemin Talks.” 
267 “Secretary Clinton’s Press.” 
268 Kan, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms,” 44; Martin, “China Warns U.S.” 
269 “U.S. Talks Focus”; Art, “The Fungibility of Force,” 19.  
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 shaped the encounters or their aftermath within the context of the broader 2001 and 2009 
confrontational patterns. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Operational opportunism, domestic pressures, issue elevation, political reaction, 
and political linkage all contain supporting and conflicting evidence as drivers of the 
PRC’s behavior across the five surveillance confrontations. It is likely that each incident 
was uniquely influenced by these dynamics in a manner only known to PRC authorities; 
however, the most probable drivers are generalizable for each encounter. The 2001 
incidents were likely driven by issue elevation leading into the new Bush presidency, 
following the convergence of PRC-U.S. pressures in the maritime domain in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. The increasingly hazardous airborne encounters from December 
2000 to April 2001 suggests that the PRC intensified it established trend of airborne 
intercepts on its maritime periphery, and expanded this behavior through an initial 
surface confrontation involving Bowditch in March, to elevate this issue across a period 
in which it was perceived to be vulnerable to political challenge.272 The 2002 Bowditch 
incident displayed the sharing of this role with the CMS, and was likely limited to 
operational opportunism, since none of the other dynamics appear present. The 2009 
incidents were most likely the result of another attempt at issue elevation, in which the 
PRC’s maritime forces were once again given the charge to opportunistically challenge 
U.S. maritime surveillance assets during a second period perceived to be vulnerable to 
political challenge; this wave of confrontations was likely specifically initiated just prior 
to Foreign Minister Yang’s meetings with U.S. leaders in early March 2009, which set 
the stage for President Obama and Hu’s first meeting in early April. EEZ surveillance 
operations have been a standing dispute between the U.S. and PRC, but the continuous 
challenge of these activities would likely have been detrimental to bilateral relations; 
therefore, it is most likely that U.S. surveillance operations are generally contested during 
specific periods when surveillance confrontations possess enhanced political efficiency. 
272 Ricks, “Anger over Flights”; Pedrozo, “Close Encounters,” 101. 
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 The surrounding geopolitical conditions also shaped the surveillance 
confrontations, but these were likely of a secondary nature. First, both periods contained 
deterrents to broader adversity, namely, the PRC’s WTO accession in 2001 and demands 
for PRC-U.S. economic cooperation in the face of the Great Recession in 2009. These 
dynamics may have mitigated political instability in PRC-U.S. relations; therefore, if 
broad surveillance confrontation initiatives reappear outside of similar deterrents in the 
future, there will be a greater chance of damage to bilateral relations or political 
escalation. Domestic pressures, political reactions, or political linkages may have also 
shaped the encounters; however, these factors likely had a limited role, and it is unlikely 
that they were the primary drivers of the PRC’s behavior. 
Another important element of these confrontations is that the 2001 and 2009 
encounters coincided with two new presidencies, which likely supported a PRC 
perception that maritime surveillance was vulnerable to political challenge; however, it 
was most likely this perception of vulnerability and a resulting calculation of enhanced 
political efficiency, not the presidential transitions themselves that led to these initiatives. 
On this basis, future periods of political efficiency in PRC-U.S. relations, during which 
the PRC perceives U.S. maritime surveillance norms to be the most susceptible to 
political challenge, are defined as vulnerability periods. The remainder of this work 
assesses the future of PRC-U.S. surveillance confrontations and provides viable 
responses towards this potentially recurring dynamic. 
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 IX. RECENT PRC-U.S. MARITIME DEVELOPMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The 2001 and 2009 confrontations were largely influenced by the development of 
PRC-U.S. maritime relations, the specific circumstances of each incident, and the 
surrounding geopolitical conditions. The likelihood of future confrontations will be 
significantly influenced by the convergence of these three factors; however, the 
development of PRC-U.S. maritime relations is the only influence that can be monitored 
for long-term trends. Five major trends in PRC-U.S. maritime relations following the 
2009 confrontations are assessed to project this future dynamic. 
B. FIVE RECENT TRENDS IN PRC-U.S. MARITIME RELATIONS 
Five major trends in PRC-U.S. maritime relations include: the U.S. strategic 
“rebalance” to Asia, enduring PRC peripheral maritime disputes, greater PRC 
institutional integration of its maritime forces, a growing projection of the PRC’s 
maritime forces outside of Asia, and advancing PRC-U.S. military to military relations. 
These trends will be explored for their impact on the PRC’s future behavior in the 
maritime domain, to include its propensity to instigate surveillance confrontations. 
1. U.S. Strategic Rebalance 
The first recent trend is the U.S. “pivot” or “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region, 
which currently has an unclear impact on future of surveillance confrontations. On 
November 17, 2011, when speaking to the Australian Parliament, President Obama stated 
that following a decade of two costly wars, the U.S. is “turning our attention to the vast 
potential of the Asia Pacific region.”273 In January 2012, the Defense Strategic Guidance 
stated: “we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region,”274 and “the 
273 Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, The White House, last modified 
November 17, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-
australian-parliament. 
274 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” The Department of 
Defense, January, 2011, 2. http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf. 
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 maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this 
dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and 
presence.”275 According to an early 2012 Open Source Center analysis, “Chinese 
officials, who have spoken on the new U.S. strategy since President Obama’s 
announcement, have stressed China’s interest in keeping ties on an even keel but have 
also signaled concern that the U.S. focus on East Asia could harm Chinese interests.”276 
The “2013 PRC White Paper on National Defense” portrayed a negative PRC strategic 
view of the rebalance: “Some country [namely, the U.S.] has strengthened its Asia-
Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently 
makes the situation there tenser.”277 Conversely, Swaine discusses the muted responses 
of the PRC’s top leadership towards this dynamic, stating: “authoritative Chinese civilian 
and military commentary on those elements of the Pacific pivot that relate to U.S. 
military strategy and defense concepts has been both very rare and restrained.”278 The 
U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region may enhance the likelihood for encounters as more 
forces from both nations operate in close proximity, but the PRC’s divergent 
interpretations and top leaderships’ ambiguity towards the rebalance makes its influence 
on surveillance confrontations unclear. 
2. PRC Peripheral Maritime Tensions 
The second recent trend is enduring confrontations on the PRC’s maritime 
periphery involving both U.S. and neighboring nations’ assets, enhancing the likelihood 
of future surveillance confrontations. Three incidents between PRC and U.S. vessels have 
occurred since the 2009 incidents, revealing enduring friction between PRC forces and 
U.S. operations in the Western Pacific. According to CNN, on June 11, 2009, a PRC 
submarine inadvertently struck the towed array of the USS John McCain (DDG-56); this 
275 Ibid. 
276 “OSC Analysis: PRC Officials, Media Signal Concern over New U.S. Defense Strategy,” January 
9, 2012, Open Source Center (CPF20120110358001). 
277 Fu Peng, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Xinhua, April 16, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm. 
278 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,” China 
Leadership Monitor 38 (2012): 7. http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-
monitor/article/124546. 
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 incident was not considered intentional harassment, but it exposes the greater danger 
associated with more PRC and U.S. forces operating in close proximity.279 The 
Washington Times reported a second incident on June 21, 2013, in which a PRC security 
ship contacted USNS Impeccable, declaring it was operating “illegally,” and was not a 
“noncombatant” ship.280 O’Rourke highlights a third incident “on December 5, 2013, in 
which a Chinese navy ship put itself in the path of the U.S. Navy cruiser Cowpens (CG-
63) as it was operating 30 or more miles from China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning (16), 
forcing the Cowpens to change course to avoid a collision.”281 The second and third 
incidents indicate continued PRC encounters with U.S. assets, increasing the likelihood 
of future surveillance confrontations. 
Since the 2009 surveillance confrontations, the PRC has also become increasingly 
confrontational towards its maritime neighbors, particularly towards the territorial claims 
of Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Oriana Maestro highlights 10 encounters from 
early 2011 into mid-2012, including: “Chinese patrol boats attempting to ram a 
Philippine vessel, Chinese vessels cutting or disabling the cables of Vietnamese survey 
ships, and China detaining 21 Vietnamese fishermen for seven weeks.”282 Ronald 
O’Rourke also states: “a confrontation in 2012 between Chinese and Philippine ships at 
Scarborough Shoal that resulted in China gaining de facto control over access to the 
shoal.”283 Across this same period, the PRC and Japan have escalated claims over the 
Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands, further fueling regional tensions. Thayer traces several events 
in this dynamic, including: a Japanese detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain in 
September 2010; a Japanese initiative under Shintaro Ishihara to purchase the Senkaku 
Islands in April 2012; and a “full-blown diplomatic crisis in August and 
279 Barbara Starr, “Sub Collides with Sonar Array Towed by U.S. Navy Ship,” CNN, June 12, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/U.S./06/12/china.submarine/. 
280 Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: New Naval Harassment in Asia,” Washington Times, July 17, 2013, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/17/inside-the-ring-new-naval-harassment-in-
asia/?page=all. 
281 O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive,” 5. 
282 Oriana S. Mastro, “The Sansha Garrison: China’s Deliberate Escalation in the South China Sea,” 
East and South China Seas Bulletin 5, (September, 2012). http://dc-9823-983315321.us-east-
1.elb.amazonaws.com/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_ESCA_bulletin5.pdf. 
283 O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive,” 12. 
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 September…comprised of the intervention of nationalist citizens from claimant countries 
[and] 20 Chinese patrol vessels entered [Japan’s] contiguous zone and/or territorial 
waters from Sept. 18 to 24, [2012].”284 On November 23, 2013 the PRC’s Ministry of 
National Defense also announced an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ), which “covers the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets claimed by China, Japan, and 
Taiwan.”285 The same day as this announcement, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
released a statement that: “We remain steadfast in our commitments to our allies and 
partners. The United States reaffirms its longstanding policy that Article V of the U.S.-
Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands.”286 The PRC’s 2013 White 
Paper states: “On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime 
rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or 
exacerbate the situation, and Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu 
Islands.”287 These examples highlight enduring maritime tensions between the PRC and 
its neighbors, demonstrating its continued use of force in this domain, increasing the 
likelihood of future surveillance confrontations. 
3. PRC Institutional Integration of Its Maritime Forces 
The third recent trend is a greater institutional integration across the PRC’s 
maritime forces. The PRC consolidated control over most of its maritime law 
enforcement assets in 2013, indicating its greater capacity to coordinate surveillance 
confrontations under the SOA and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). This 
integration is likely to increase the PRC’s effectiveness during future encounters. Kan 
states: 
284 Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Risk to U.S. Rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific?” 
USNI News, February 5, 2013, 2–4. http://news.usni.org/2012/10/16/senkaku-islands-dispute-risk-us-
rebalancing-asia-pacific. 
285 Nicholas Szechenyi et al., “China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Impact on Regional 
Security,” Center For Strategic and International Studies, November 26, 2013, 
https://csis.org/publication/chinas-air-defense-identification-zone-impact-regional-security. 
286 Chuck Hagel, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 23, 2013, 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392. 
287 Fu, “The Diversified Employment.” 
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 On March 10, [2013,] the PRC announced that the maritime law 
enforcement forces (other than those under the Ministry of Transportation) 
would be reorganized as a new Coast Guard under the administration of 
the SOA and the direction of the MPS. A coordinating body, the State 
Maritime Committee, would be set up in the reorganization of CMS, 
[People’s Armed Police] PAP, FLEC, and Customs forces into a Coast 
Guard. These developments appeared linked to the reported increased 
coordination since 2012 by top leader Xi Jinping, who reportedly has 
headed a Leading Small Group on Maritime Security.288 
These efforts indicate a greater PRC capacity to execute control over the its EEZ, which 
is likely to increase its effectiveness at challenging operations on its maritime periphery, 
to include the harassment of U.S. surveillance activities. 
4. PRC Projection of Maritime Forces Outside of Asia 
The fourth recent trend is an increased projection of PRC maritime forces outside 
of Asia, indicating the potential for confrontation or cooperation in distant domains, 
either of which is likely to have parallel influences upon future surveillance 
confrontations. The Department of Defense (DOD) report: “Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,” (2013 CMSD) highlights 
that these endeavors include Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) 
missions in East Asia and the Caribbean, and a “Gulf of Aden counterpiracy deployment 
that began in December 2008.”289 These initiatives provide potential venues for PRC-
U.S. maritime cooperation, reducing the likelihood of future surveillance confrontations. 
A second attribute of this trend is the initiation of surveillance operations in the 
U.S.’s EEZ by the PRC, similar in disposition to those it contests. The 2013 CMSD 
indicated that PLA surveillance vessels have been sighted operating around Guam, as 
well as Hawaii during the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2012: 
PLA Navy has begun to conduct military activities within the Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations, without the permission of those 
coastal states. Of note, the United States has observed over the past year 
288 Kan, “U.S.-China Military,” 28. 
289 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 
of China 2013,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013, 29. 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf. 
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 several instances of Chinese naval activities in the EEZ around Guam and 
Hawaii. One of those instances was during the execution of the annual 
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July/August 2012. While the 
United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be lawful, 
the activity undercuts China’s decades-old position that similar foreign 
military activities in China’s EEZ are unlawful.290  
While these activities may suggest that the PRC is shifting its stance on the legality of 
surveillance operations in the EEZ, its actions nearly a year after RIMPAC 2012 towards 
USNS Impeccable on June 21, 2013, indicate it has not fully embraced this norm.291 
Increased PRC maritime projection outside of Asia provides opportunities for broader 
cooperation or alternate venues for adversity, revealing a trend that can either decrease or 
increase the likelihood of future surveillance confrontations, depending on the nature of 
these activities. 
5. Growing PRC-U.S. Military To Military Relations 
A fifth recent trend is improving PRC-U.S. military to military relations, which 
may reduce the likelihood future surveillance confrontations. The 2013 PRC Defense 
White Paper states: “China’s armed forces work to promote dialogue and cooperation on 
maritime security…international merchant shipping protection and disaster relief 
operations, [and] conduct joint exercises and training with foreign counterparts.”292 
Several recent cooperative initiatives support these statements. The U.S. Navy reported 
that on August 24 and 25, 2012, the “guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87) 
participated in a counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden with elements of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (Navy).”293 Following this exercise, on September 18, 2012, 
Secretary of Defense Panetta announced “the United States Navy will invite China to 
290 Ibid., 39. 
291 Gertz, “Inside the Ring.” 
292 Fu, “The Diversified Employment.” 
293 Rob Aylward, “U.S., China Conduct Counter Piracy Exercise,” Navy News Service, August 26, 
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 send a ship to participate in the RIMPAC 2014 exercise;”294 and “he hopes China’s 
participation in RIMPAC 2014 will build on the positive momentum generated by a 
counterpiracy exercise the two nations took part in last week in the Gulf of Aden.”295 On 
June 8, 2013, PRC State Councilor Yang Jiechi accepted the invitation to RIMPAC 2014 
following a meeting with President Obama.296 Additionally, on September 9, 2013, “as 
part of a broader advancement in cooperation between the United States and China, the 
guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) and the People’s Liberation Army-Navy 
[PLAN] participated in training scenarios off the coast of Oahu, Hawaii.”297 Finally, the 
Navy Times reported that the PRC adopted CUES on April 22, 2014, a mechanism that 
may help avert maritime confrontations, which is “not legally binding, [but] China’s 
adoption of the code indicates its increased willingness to engage with its neighbors.”298 
These events indicate improving PRC-U.S. military to military relations, decreasing the 
likelihood of future surveillance confrontations. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Previous PRC-U.S. surveillance confrontations were shaped by the development 
of PRC-U.S. maritime relations, the specific circumstances of each incident, and the 
surrounding geopolitical settings. The investigation of recent maritime developments 
enables a projection of this element of previous encounters, helping to predict the 
likelihood of future recurrences. Five recent maritime trends and their likely effects upon 
surveillance confrontations include: the uncertain influence of U.S. strategic rebalance, 
294 Karen Parrish, “Panetta: Navy Will Invite China to Pacific Rim Exercise,” American Forces Press 
Service, September 18, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117902. 
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 the negative influences of PRC peripheral maritime tensions, the enhanced effectiveness 
of the PRC’s maritime assets from their greater institutional integration, the mixed 
potentials of PRC maritime projection outside of Asia, and the positive influences of 
growing PRC-U.S. military to military relations. The interpretation, emphasis, and 
guidance of each of these trends by both the PRC and U.S. will largely determine the 
bilateral maritime relationship, which in turn is likely to influence the future of 
surveillance confrontations. Monitoring maritime developments also enables the U.S. to 
identify adverse trends, so it can enact appropriate military mitigation strategies during 
future vulnerability periods, which are discussed in the following chapter. 
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 X. U.S. MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the 2009 surveillance confrontations, several policy options were 
explored, including: alternative surveillance activities, reduction of surveillance, and a 
PRC-U.S. INCSEA agreement; however, these solutions were assessed for broad 
application.299 Monitoring the trends of recent maritime developments and identifying 
future periods vulnerable to political challenge enables adaptive responses towards the 
reemergence of surveillance confrontations. This chapter develops a range of military 
options that are specifically applicable during these future vulnerability periods. While it 
is uncertain if these encounters will recur, or that they will follow pervious patterns, 
preparing a comprehensive plan consisting of appropriate strategic, operational, and 
tactical responses enables military planners to ideally shaped forces to hedge against this 
possibility. 
B. MILITARY IMPLICATIONS 
Exposing the varied drivers of surveillance confrontations undercuts previous 
assertions that these encounters are wholly the result of local commanders’ initiatives, 
irrational aggression, military expansionism, or PLAN operational sensitivities. The 
primary implication of surveillance confrontations originating above local commanders is 
that these encounters have geopolitical origins; therefore, they may transpire regardless of 
military to military relations or other conventional mitigation strategies. Traditional 
approaches to these incidents have revolved around bilateral and multilateral mechanisms 
and military discussions, evidenced by President Obama’s March 12, 2009 stressing of 
“the importance of raising the frequency of the U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue 
in order to avoid future incidents.”300 Current military discussion mechanisms and 
bilateral and multilateral measures include: UNCLOS, ICAO, COLREGS, CUES, and the 
MMCA; however, all of these mechanisms are predicated on a mutual desire for 
299 O’Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive,” 49–50. 
300 “Obama Calls for Improved.” 
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 cooperation in the maritime domain. Although these measures may be useful to reduce 
PRC-U.S. incidents under normal conditions, when surveillance confrontations are driven 
by geopolitical factors, these measures are less effective because an underlying intention 
to create confrontation exists. Exploring a range of military options applicable during 
vulnerability periods enables the U.S. Navy to preemptively adapt its forces, which can 
potentially reduce confrontations, collisions, escalation, PRC-U.S. relational damage, and 
conflict from these encounters. 
C. ARRAY OF U.S. MILITARY OPTIONS 
Military solutions to surveillance confrontations can be found on the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. After assessing current trends in maritime relations and 
identifying vulnerability periods, a comprehensive plan can be constructed from several 
options across these levels. This plan should align to national objectives regarding the 
overarching geopolitical circumstances. Each option is weighed for costs and benefits in 
support of this plan. Theatre planners, aware of political objectives, and armed with real-
time information are best suited to create a comprehensive plan for future surveillance 
confrontation vulnerability periods. 
1. Strategic Options 
The strategic options available to prepare for vulnerability periods involves 
choosing between strategic suspension of military surveillance and the status quo; either 
of which is supportable by supplemental strategic measures. The effects of these options 
are closely tied to the political atmosphere, and likely require close coordination with 
civilian leaders. The costs and benefits of these options will be contrasted to weigh their 
viability in a comprehensive plan. 
1. Strategic surveillance suspension involves ceasing surveillance operations 
during vulnerability periods. 
Temporary suspension of surveillance is not a surrender of freedom of navigation, but a 
temporary gap in its application. Some benefits of this decision are the prevention of 
surveillance confrontations, safety of forces, and avoidance of escalation. Some costs of 
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 this decision are gaps in surveillance, possible PRC perceptions of U.S. concessions, and 
a chance that the PRC may pursue more adverse political strategies. 
2. Maintaining the status quo is also an option available during vulnerability 
periods, and is subject to an inverse cost-benefit calculation. 
The status quo entails continuing maritime surveillance regardless of overarching PRC-
U.S. relational dynamics. Some costs of this decision are the heightened potential for 
surveillance confrontations during vulnerability periods, danger to forces, and possible 
escalation. Some benefits of this decision are uninterrupted surveillance operations, 
maintenance of freedom of navigation norms, and the possible prevention of more 
adverse political strategies. 
3. Supplemental strategic measures are also available regardless of the 
strategic option selected, which may discourage surveillance 
confrontation, its escalation, and conflict. 
These measures focus on PRC-U.S. cooperative endeavors during vulnerability periods, 
which could positively refocus bilateral pressures and create mechanisms to serve as 
alternate, less costly signals to alleviate geopolitical tensions. Some activities that could 
be scheduled during vulnerability periods include: additional PRC-U.S. joint exercises, 
joint humanitarian operations, or joint counter-piracy operations. One example of this 
option is a joint PRC-U.S. maritime exercise aligned to major bilateral diplomacy, 
particularly following U.S. presidential transitions. These activities could supplement 
either temporary strategic suspension or the status quo, and carry the additional benefit of 
enhanced bilateral cooperation during relatively unstable periods in PRC-U.S. relations. 
If historical tensions are present during future vulnerability periods, these exercises might 
also be canceled or shortened by either side as an understood replacement signal that 
would initiate bilateral policy discussions–a signal that does not put any U.S. or PRC 
forces in danger, or possibly lead to escalation. Some costs of these activities involve 
additional assets for these ventures, and overcoming current barriers to PRC-U.S. military 
cooperation. Susan Lawrence highlights these barriers: 
Further development of the [PRC-U.S.] military-to-military relationship is 
subject to restrictions imposed by Congress. The National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106–65) bars 
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 exchanges or contacts with China’s military that include ‘inappropriate 
exposure’ to a range of subjects, including surveillance and 
reconnaissance operations. The provision remains a major irritant in the 
bilateral relationship, with Chinese authorities arguing that it signals U.S. 
ill will. For its part, China remains wary that closer ties will expose 
vulnerabilities in its weaker force. It has also been suspicious of the 
intentions behind the U.S. policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.301  
Although specific limitations exist, several exercises involving PRC and U.S. forces have 
recently been scheduled that fall outside of these restrictions, including joint disaster 
exercises and RIMPAC 2014; therefore, it may be an ideal time for PRC-U.S. 
cooperative military ventures that are shaped around this dynamic.302 
Strategic surveillance suspension and the status quo are two options that should be 
assessed in relation to U.S. political objectives. Supplemental strategic measures are also 
available under either option to engage the PRC during future vulnerability periods. 
Selection between these options should be coordinated with the overarching political 
posture to synchronize U.S. national responses towards this future dynamic. 
2. Operational Options 
If the strategic status quo is selected, several operational options remain available 
to military planners, which are less dependent upon the political landscape to mitigate 
surveillance confrontations. These options involve adjusting the shape and dispositions of 
surveillance assets employed during vulnerability periods. Unmanned aerial vehicles, 
submarine forces, unmanned underwater vehicles, prepositioned escorts, escorted 
operations, and the operational status quo are all explored as potential responses to this 
future dynamic. 
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 1. Unmanned aerial vehicle replacements for airborne surveillance assets are 
the first option available during vulnerability periods. 
A cost of this option is the reduction of surveillance capabilities, which may eventually 
be overcome through technological improvements. A benefit of this option is the 
protection of aircrew. 
2. Submarine surveillance replacements for USNS surveillance vessels are 
another option available during vulnerability periods. 
Some costs of this option are a temporary removal of visible freedom of navigation 
activities and a reduction in surveillance assets and capabilities. Some benefits of this 
decision are the prevention of harassment while maintaining some surveillance 
capabilities. 
3. Unmanned underwater vehicles are an operational technology that could 
also be further developed for use during vulnerability periods. 
The costs and benefits of this option are similar as for the employment of submarine 
forces, with the additional cost of technological development and production, and the 
additional benefit of less danger to personnel. 
4. Prepositioned escorts are another option available during vulnerability 
periods. 
This option provides a rapid response capability by positioning armed airborne and/or 
surface assets in the proximity of surveillance activities for rapid responses, while 
avoiding potentially instigative escorted surveillance operations. Some costs of this 
option are the requirements for additional prepositioned escort assets and the potential for 
the PRC’s misinterpretation of these activities. Some benefits of this option are rapid U.S. 
responses, which may deter confrontation and prevent escalation. 
5. Escorted operations are another option available during vulnerability 
periods. 
This option is based on a need to continue surveillance operations, while denying the 
PRC’s ability to use these encounters for geopolitical objectives. Applying this option 
entails fighter aircraft escorting airborne surveillance and/or surface forces escorting 
surveillance operations during vulnerability periods. Some costs of this option entail the 
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 employment of extra assets, perceived PRC militarization of surveillance operations, 
potential PRC misinterpretations of escalation, and the potential emergence of alternate, 
more adverse strategies. Some benefits of this option are the denial of surveillance 
confrontations and the protection of surveillance assets during vulnerability periods. 
6. The status quo is the final option available during vulnerability periods. 
This option entails continuing surveillance operations, unchanged in shape or disposition. 
Some costs of this option are the continued exposure of surveillance assets to heightened 
danger during vulnerability periods, potential escalation, and the PRC’s continued 
application of surveillance confrontations for geopolitical purposes. Some benefits of this 
option include the maintenance of freedom of navigation and surveillance norms, and 
preservation of these venues to relieve geopolitical pressures, possibly preventing more 
adverse strategies. 
If the strategic status quo is chosen, several operational options are available to 
protect surveillance operations during vulnerability periods. Operational options also may 
need to be coordinated with political counterparts to synchronize national responses. 
Many of these options are not exclusive, and a comprehensive strategy may involve some 
combination of these or additional options yet to be developed. 
3. Tactical Options 
If the strategic and operational status quos are both selected, several tactical 
options are available to prepare surveillance assets for vulnerability periods. Tactical 
options consist of avoiding harassment, controlling harassment, and rapidly reporting 
harassment. These three options will be discussed for further development and may be 
useful to mitigate any surveillance confrontations regardless of when they occur. 
1. Avoidance of harassment by surveillance vessels and aircraft is a tactical 
option that may limit future surveillance confrontations. 
This option involves avoiding areas where opposing units are located, particularly during 
vulnerability periods. This option is unlikely to be completely effective because the 
PRC’s maritime assets have access throughout contentious areas and surveillance assets 
are generally slower than harassing forces. 
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 2. Controlling harassment is another tactical option that may mitigate future 
surveillance confrontations. 
This option involves developing new equipment and procedures to manage these 
encounters. New equipment may include non-lethal vessel modifications, such as 
improved fire hoses, safety bumpers, enhanced lights, sonic weapons, reinforced cabins, 
force protection measures, or other innovations that could be developed by subject matter 
experts or the crews of surveillance assets. New tactical response procedures may also be 
necessary for standardization across surveillance assets. Any options that fall into this 
category must be carefully assessed to prevent unintended escalation. 
3. Rapid confirmation of harassment is the final tactical option available as a 
response to future surveillance confrontations. 
This option entails enhanced capabilities to transmit information back to high-level 
commanders, political leaders, and media sources. This measure enables surveillance 
confrontations to be rapidly understood and published to acknowledge the PRC’s 
underlying geopolitical drivers, which may prevent further escalation or accidents. This 
option must be assessed to ensure it is aligned with U.S. political objectives, and does 
invite additional surveillance confrontations. 
If the strategic and operational status quos are both selected, several tactical 
options are available to protect surveillance activities during vulnerability periods. These 
options include avoiding, controlling, and rapidly reporting harassment activities. These 
options are less connected to the political atmosphere; however, they should be assessed 
to ensure they do not escalate harassment into broader conflict. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Understanding that PRC-U.S. surveillance confrontations are more likely to occur 
during periods vulnerable to issue elevation demands innovative military responses to 
this complex problem. It is vital that military planners mitigate the hazards of these 
activities to prevent recurrences of the near EP-3 crash in 2001, through strategic, 
operational, and tactical innovations. The recommendation of this analysis is for 
combatant, theatre, and fleet planners to use real time information, to develop a 
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 comprehensive plan prior to these vulnerability periods. This plan should be aligned with 
national political objectives, shaping forces to most effectively mitigate, deter, or prevent 
the adverse consequences of these encounters. To accomplish this, the plan should 
integrate options from the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, consider other 
innovative measures, and anticipate potential adaptive strategies by the PRC. This plan 
should also balance the need to protect U.S. forces, national interests, and long-term 
PRC-U.S. relations. An example of a comprehensive plan for future vulnerability periods 
could include: strategically minimized surface and manned airborne surveillance, 
concurrent PLAN engagement activities, pre-positioned responsive escorts, and tactically 
and procedurally enhanced U.S. surveillance assets. Evaluating, preparing, and 
implementing a comprehensive plan prior to future vulnerability periods may avert 
surveillance confrontations, escalation, and conflict–protecting U.S. military, diplomatic, 
and national interests. 
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